Before we begin: This briefing is now part of Terton Intel, my new intelligence and analysis venture. If you find this useful, you can explore more at tertonintel.com.

The Takeaway

Three sharp developments this week show Beijing pressing on multiple fronts while its own elite fractures. First, Moonshot AI released Kimi K3, the world’s largest open-weight AI model, which benchmarks near top U.S. systems at a fraction of the cost, compressing the U.S.-China performance gap to roughly six months. Second, Papua New Guinea ordered Taipei’s representative office to close, prompting Taiwan’s foreign minister to announce a formal review of economic ties, including natural-gas purchases. Third, China expelled Politburo member Ma Xingrui in one of the most serious corruption cases of Xi’s third term, signaling that even the highest technocrats are not immune. Together, they highlight China’s simultaneous advances in tech competition and diplomatic isolation, even as internal discipline tightens.

1. Moonshot AI’s Kimi K3 narrows U.S. lead with open-weight breakthrough

Kimi K3 compared to other models (Source: Moonshot AI)

The Big Picture: Beijing-based Moonshot AI unveiled Kimi K3 on July 16-17, calling it the largest open-weight model to date (2.8 trillion parameters, 1M-token context). Independent tests place it in the frontier tier alongside Anthropic’s Claude Fable 5 and ahead of several OpenAI models on key tasks, accelerating the erosion of America’s technological edge.

The Details:

• The Release: K3 is fully open-weight, with full model weights scheduled for July 27. It features advanced long-context handling (Kimi Delta Attention for up to 6.3x faster decoding) and was timed to coincide with President Xi Jinping’s address at the World AI Conference in Shanghai.

• Performance Data: Artificial Analysis ranks K3 fourth overall but ahead of Anthropic’s Opus 4.8 and several GPT-5 variants on its Intelligence Index. On terminal-style agentic coding (Terminal Bench 2.1), K3 scores 88.3, slightly ahead of Claude Opus 4.8 and within half a point of GPT-5.6 Sol. It also leads on some coding and front-end benchmarks.

• Cost Advantage: API pricing is about $3/$15 per million input/output tokens, below comparable U.S. frontier models on a per-task basis, making Chinese open systems increasingly attractive to global developers.

• Market Signal: Nasdaq fell roughly 1% on July 17 as investors trimmed AI-chip names (Nvidia, Intel) on fears of faster Chinese catch-up.

Between the Lines: Stanford’s Graham Webster notes the U.S.-China performance gap has compressed to about six months. Experts warn a fully matching open Chinese model is now a near-term prospect, complicating U.S. export-control strategy and the economics of closed, capital-intensive American systems. On the same day, Xi called for AI as “a symphony of international cooperation” rather than domination by any single country.

Why It Matters: Open-weight Chinese models are turning U.S. chip restrictions into a partial own-goal. By delivering near-frontier performance at dramatically lower cost and with full openness, China is both undercutting American commercial advantages and creating a global developer ecosystem less dependent on U.S. closed models. Downstream risks include faster diffusion of advanced capabilities for dual-use applications and greater difficulty for Washington in maintaining a decisive technological lead.

2. PNG closes Taiwan office; Taipei escalates with gas-import review

The Big Picture: Papua New Guinea’s July 16 order to shut Taipei’s representative office in Port Moresby triggered a concrete Taiwanese counter-move on July 18: Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung announced a formal reassessment of economic ties, specifically including natural-gas purchases.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: PNG Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko declared the office must “immediately cease operations”, citing the One-China principle and the 50th anniversary of PNG-PRC relations; Taiwan said the decision came without prior consultation.

• Beijing’s Response: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian publicly “highly appreciated” the move.

• Taipei’s Escalation: After initially protesting and insisting the office would continue operating, Lin said on July 18 that Taiwan is reviewing economic relations with PNG, specifically including LNG imports, where Taiwan is a significant buyer.

• U.S. Position: The State Department expressed deep concern, calling the closure “another example of Beijing’s intimidation” of Taiwan and its partners.

Why It Matters: This is a textbook application of Beijing’s isolation strategy using bilateral leverage and anniversary timing. Taiwan’s decision to put gas purchases on the table marks its first serious attempt to impose commercial costs in response. If followed through, it could raise the price for other Pacific states considering similar steps. The episode shows diplomatic setbacks can now trigger measurable economic friction.

3. Ma Xingrui’s downfall: Politburo purge exposes limits of Xi’s technocratic elite

The Big Picture: On July 14, China expelled Ma Xingrui from the Communist Party, making him the third sitting Politburo member purged since 2025. The case, announced via Xinhua and carried on the front page of People’s Daily on July 15, signals that even Xi’s most trusted technocrats are not immune from the anti-corruption drive.

The Details:

Official Charges: The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) accused Ma of:

• “丧失理想信念和政治立场，背弃党的宗旨和初心使命” (losing ideals and political stance, abandoning the party’s purpose and original mission)

• “搞权色、钱色交易” (engaging in power-for-sex and money-for-sex transactions)

• “大搞家族腐败” (large-scale family corruption)

• “违规收受礼品、礼金，帮助亲属低价购房” (illegally accepting gifts and money, helping relatives buy houses at discounted prices)

The official announcement concluded: “马兴瑞完全背离党性原则，严重违背党中央对高级干部提出的政治要求，其行为严重违反党的纪律，构成职务违法并涉嫌受贿犯罪，且在党的十八大后不收敛、不收手，性质极其严重，影响极其恶劣” (Ma completely abandoned party principles, seriously violated political requirements for senior cadres, and his behavior was extremely serious in nature with enormous social impact).

How It Was Treated: The July 15 People’s Daily placement signals this was treated as a major disciplinary case, but notably the language avoided terms like “forming factions” or “undermining party unity” that appear in military purges such as Zhang Youxia and He Weidong. Instead, the emphasis was on corruption, family misconduct, and abuse of power, suggesting a structural corruption case rather than a political conspiracy.

Timeline: Ma was placed under investigation in April 2026, abruptly stepped down as Xinjiang party secretary in July 2025, and disappeared from public view by late 2025. He skipped the Two Sessions in March 2026, deepening speculation about his fall.

Why It Matters: Ma’s case shows three things. First, Xi’s anti-corruption drive is now penetrating the highest levels of the Politburo, not just the military or lower ranks. Second, the focus on family corruption and sex-for-power transactions mirrors language used in earlier high-profile cases, suggesting a playbook for dismantling even senior figures. Third, the absence of overtly political language (no mention of factions or disloyalty) suggests Ma was treated as a corruption case rather than a purge, which may limit the political fallout but still signals that Xi’s inner circle is not untouchable.

For Xi, this is both a strength and a vulnerability. It demonstrates he can still discipline the elite, but it also exposes how deeply corruption has penetrated his own handpicked technocrats. The message to other officials is clear: even rocket scientists turned Politburo members are not safe.

Bottom Line

China is advancing on both the technology frontier (open-weight models closing the gap rapidly) and the diplomatic front (shrinking Taiwan’s Pacific footprint), even as its own elite faces unprecedented internal discipline. The Kimi K3 release is the more strategically consequential long-term development; the PNG episode is the sharper near-term test of whether Taiwan can impose costs; and the Ma Xingrui case reveals the fragility of Xi’s technocratic elite.

Watch for: actual changes in Taiwan-PNG energy contracts; independent verification of Kimi K3’s sustained performance after the full weights drop on July 27; any further Pacific capitals under parallel pressure; and whether additional Politburo members face investigation before the 2027 Party Congress.

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From information to insight

Open-source information is more abundant than ever. Yet useful intelligence remains difficult to produce.

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Built around tradecraft

Terton Intelligence is founder-led and built around the realities of intelligence work: incomplete information, conflicting reporting, language barriers, limited time, and decisions that cannot wait for perfect certainty.

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Services

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China OSINT Course

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Request a demo

Argus is not yet publicly live, but I am now accepting requests for demonstrations.

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This is the start of a larger build. New datasets, research tools, and analytical features will be added over time, but the standard will remain consistent: rigorous verification, transparent reasoning, and intelligence designed to support consequential decisions.

Please express your interest if you would like to demo Argus, I will get back to you in the due course.

We’re continuing to build and refine the China OSINT course—and it’s quickly evolving beyond its original format. What started as a focused training resource is becoming a more dynamic, continuously updated toolkit for researchers working with Chinese-language sources.

In the coming weeks, I’ll be rolling out new features, expanded modules, and practical workflows designed to make investigations faster, more reliable, and accessible even without Mandarin fluency. The goal is simple: create a living resource that grows alongside the changing Chinese information environment.

If you sign up now for Tier 2, you’ll also get early access to some of the upcoming verification tools and new features as they are released.

If you haven’t explored the course yet, you can learn more here: https://www.asiacommunique.com/p/announcing-china-osint-course-for.

The newsletter follows below.

The number that should worry people is this: roughly 90 percent of Russian missiles and drones examined by Ukrainian investigators contain Japanese-made electronics. That detail pulls together a much bigger story. The region is no longer being shaped only by summits, speeches, or military drills. It is being shaped by supply chains, intelligence networks, detention cases, arms sales, and chip investment, with pressure building across Taiwan, Japan, China, and the wider Indo-Pacific.

South China Sea pushback

On the 10th anniversary of the 2016 arbitration ruling, 14 countries including the U.S., Japan, Australia, Canada, Britain, Germany, and Italy issued a joint statement rejecting China’s maritime claims and reaffirming the ruling’s finality under international law. The statement also highlighted dangerous China Coast Guard maneuvers near Philippine features, which made it more than a ceremonial anniversary statement.

Beijing dismissed the move and accused the countries involved of stirring up trouble. That matters because it shows the central contest is still over whether China can normalize its claims through constant presence, while the U.S. and its partners are trying to draw a legal and diplomatic line that keeps those claims from hardening into the regional baseline.

Tech blacklists keep tightening

The U.S. and China are still locked in a mutual blacklist cycle that is spreading from industrial policy into national security. In June, the Pentagon added about 188 Chinese military-linked companies focused on advanced technology, while China retaliated by placing 10 U.S. firms in robotics, rare earths, and defense on export-control lists and blocking 46 U.S. defense-related firms from government procurement.

China has now expanded its rare earth restrictions again, adding holmium, erbium, thulium, europium, and ytterbium to the export-control list, along with related processing equipment and technology for mining, smelting, separation, magnet production, recycling, and production-line upgrades. The latest move also tightens scrutiny on defense end users and advanced semiconductor-related exports, making the policy less about raw materials alone and more about control over the industrial chain that depends on them.

This is no longer just trade friction. It is a slow conversion of strategic industries into sanctions terrain. That raises costs, disrupts supply chains, and pushes more countries into the uncomfortable position of having to hedge between the two sides.

Taiwan’s drill is the real signal

The biggest Taiwan story right now is not a new Chinese move. It is Taiwan’s own defense posture. Taiwan is in the middle of its longest-ever Han Kuang exercise, a 10-day, 9-night drill running from July 9 to 18, with the full combat phase taking place from July 13 to 18. The exercise covers anti-landing operations, coastal combat, defense in depth, and long-duration warfare scenarios.

This year’s drill is especially notable because Taiwan is using it to test both hardware and command structure. The exercise includes U.S.-supplied HIMARS, Tien Chien II air-defense missiles, TOW 2B anti-armor missiles, drones, and M1A2T Abrams tanks, while more than 22,000 reservists are involved. President Lai personally watched the tank live-fire drill, where four M1A2T tanks reportedly hit every target, underscoring that Taiwan is trying to show not just equipment but confidence in how it uses it.

A new detail from Focus Taiwan adds another layer. On Monday, Taiwan’s military launched a separate joint defense exercise featuring Marine Corps mobilization operations to reinforce the Taipei metropolitan area, with scenarios that include hostile vessels entering Taiwan’s territorial waters and the integration of the three services. That matters because it shows Taiwan is not just rehearsing battlefield tactics in the abstract. It is also practicing how to defend the capital and how to link maritime warning, joint command, and urban response in a real crisis.

The M1 tanks matter for more than symbolism. Taiwan bought 108 M1A2T tanks from the U.S. in a $1.45 billion deal, and the first 38 have already been delivered, with the rest still coming in stages. In practical terms, the tanks strengthen Taiwan’s ability to defend key areas, while the live-fire debut signals that Taipei wants to integrate these systems into wartime planning, alongside drones and other newer systems.

PLA activity around Taiwan has stayed more controlled than dramatic. In June 2026, Taiwan tracked 208 PLA aircraft sorties around the island, down sharply from 499 in June 2025. Median-line crossings fell to 36, and no bomber flights were recorded, even as the PLAN maintained a steady daily presence of five to 10 vessels. Beijing is keeping up the pressure, but it is not trying to steal the spotlight from Taiwan’s drill with a major spike.

Japan becomes a security node

Japan now sits inside the same strategic picture, but in a different way. It is both a target for foreign intelligence activity and a country trying to rebuild its own intelligence system. A New York Times investigation says Russian military intelligence used Japan as a procurement hub for electronics and dual-use components for missiles and drones, despite sanctions. Some GRU operatives reportedly moved there after the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats from Western countries in 2022.

Tokyo is trying to close that gap. Japan is standing up a new national intelligence agency to coordinate roughly 33,000 personnel across government, following earlier legislation that created a National Intelligence Council and a National Intelligence Bureau structure. Japanese officials have already acknowledged the need to do more against foreign intelligence activity. That makes the Russia story more than a sanctions scandal. It is one of the clearest reasons Japan is now rebuilding its intelligence capacity.

China detains a U.S. seismologist

There is another intelligence angle here that is easy to overlook but important. Reuters reported that China has detained an American seismologist who studied North Korean nuclear tests, and she has reportedly been held for nearly two years. Chinese officials also reportedly questioned her husband more than 100 times about his work on nuclear test signatures.

That case shows how quickly technical and scientific work can become politically sensitive. It also fits the broader pattern in this briefing. States are treating access to expertise, technical data, and scientific research as a security issue, not just an academic one.

What to watch

- Whether Beijing responds to the South China Sea anniversary statement with new Coast Guard activity near the Philippines or Taiwan.

- Whether the Taiwan arms package moves or stays stuck in U.S.-China bargaining.

- What Taiwan’s Han Kuang exercise shows about reserve mobilization, drones, and decentralized command.

- Whether Japan will tighten export enforcement after the Russia procurement reporting.

- Whether the detained U.S. seismologist case becomes part of a broader North Korea or U.S.-China security dispute.

A student in Shanghai pays a stranger on Xianyu the equivalent of fifteen dollars a month for a “shared” ChatGPT Plus login, a connection routed through a Hong Kong proxy that invariably drops every few days. Despite the instability, the student renews the subscription the following month. This transaction—small, informal, and repeated across hundreds of thousands of users—represents the true state of artificial intelligence adoption within the People’s Republic of China. The prevailing narrative often focuses on whether frontier models like ChatGPT or Claude are officially blocked by the Great Firewall. The reality, widely acknowledged by those operating within the domestic digital ecosystem, is that the block is merely a friction point, not an impenetrable barrier.

Public discourse across Chinese social media platforms and developer forums points to a surprisingly active, highly commercialized workaround economy. Accessing Western large language models (LLMs) is not a binary state; it is a shifting mix of network routes, account setups, financial laundering mechanisms, and trust in whichever digital middleman is selling the most viable workaround in any given month. This shadow infrastructure profoundly changes how global technology firms and geopolitical analysts should conceptualize AI adoption inside China. Frontier models are not absent from the workflows of Chinese students, developers, and researchers. They are constrained, filtered, and frequently expensive, but they are deeply integrated into the daily digital fabric of the nation.

Case Study: Deconstructing a Shanghai Practitioner’s Subscription Stack

To understand how these concepts manifest in a single user’s daily life, we can analyze the subscription dashboard of an active AI practitioner based in Shanghai, China. This image captures the ultimate realization of the cross-border “access stack.”

Read more

This week’s Asia Communique digs into China’s July 6 SLBM launch, the identification dispute it sparked, and the flight path that ties it to Japan, the Philippines, and the wider Pacific.

At 12:01 p.m. on Monday, July 6, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine carried out something Beijing had never publicly acknowledged before: a submarine-launched ballistic missile test into the Pacific. But navigation warning information suggests China may originally have considered two different test profiles for that day: one from the Bohai Sea flying over Japan toward the Pacific, and another from the South China Sea, likely crossing over the Philippines, with the second option appearing to be the one that actually occurred. Xinhua said the missile carried a dummy warhead, landed precisely in designated waters, and was part of the PLA’s annual training plan, while insisting it was not aimed at any specific country or target and that relevant countries had been notified in advance.

The launch also coincided with the opening of Joint Sea 2026 in Qingdao, the annual China-Russia naval exercise held every year since 2012. However, there is no confirmation that Russia was involved in the missile test itself, and Beijing has portrayed the launch as its own military activity. This edition traces what we actually know about the missile, the still-live dispute over whether it was a JL-2 or JL-3, what Chinese state media and allied commentators are saying, what the maps circulating online suggest about the launch and target corridor, how this compares to Beijing’s 2024 DF-31AG shot into the Pacific, and why Japan keeps surfacing as one of the most revealing angles in the story.

The Missile: A Live Dispute, Not a Consensus

The first question anyone watching this story asked was simple: which missile was it? The honest answer is that experts do not agree, and the disagreement matters more than most coverage has let on.

Chinese state-linked commentary moved quickly toward the JL-3. In a Global Times write-up, military commentators Zhang Junshe and Song Zhongping, both frequently quoted PLA-adjacent voices, assessed the missile as “highly likely” to be the JL-3, reading the cues from Xinhua’s official wording and the missile’s debut at Beijing’s September 2025 military parade ten months earlier. Song went further, calling the JL-3 probability “extremely high,” and explained the test’s purpose in specific terms: the missile had already completed high-trajectory and low-trajectory tests, and needed a near-full-range trajectory shot to validate its ballistic performance and combat reliability under realistic conditions. Zhang added the broader strategic framing, describing the JL-3 as China’s self-developed third-generation SLBM and now the backbone of its sea-based deterrent, with a range he put above 10,000 kilometers. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury, independently told reporters it was “highly probable” the missile tested was the JL-3.

Taiwan’s own intelligence assessment points the other way. Taiwan’s National Security Council identified the missile as a JL-2, launched from a Type 094 Jin-class submarine, based on an estimated flight distance of roughly 6,300 kilometers, well short of the JL-3’s claimed 10,000-plus kilometer range and closer to the JL-2’s established profile. That distance discrepancy is the crux of the dispute: if the missile only flew 6,300 km, calling it a JL-3 test of “near-full-range” performance, as Song Zhongping did, becomes harder to square with the numbers.

Now, Lewis thinks the missile might be JL-2 after all, but we have no way of confirming:

What is not in dispute is Lewis’s broader read on the moment, independent of missile type. In a post on X, he wrote plainly that “nuclear weapons states have missiles and they test them,” a reminder that testing itself is not inherently newsworthy behavior for a nuclear power. But he paired that with a sharper point elsewhere: China’s historic restraint on long-range missile testing, driven by political sensitivity rather than technical limitation, appears to be eroding, and more tests of this kind should be expected.

Also worth reading are the comments by Tong Zhao, a leading authority on China's nuclear program.

The Maps and the Reactions

Map source:

What made this test different from a quiet Bohai Bay shot was where the missile reportedly went. Unofficial flight-path maps and Taiwan’s own tracking showed the missile crossing the exclusive economic zones of Palau, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia before landing roughly 1,000 kilometers northeast of the Solomon Islands, closest to the EEZs of Tuvalu and Kiribati. CSIS’s Missile Threat project flagged this as China’s first SLBM test ever conducted into international waters, a milestone distinct from the missile type itself.

Read more

Note: The newsletter edition was corrected and republished to remove additional links in the earlier edition.

1. Xi marks CCP’s 105th anniversary with global, not just domestic, messaging.

(Above image was generated using AI)

The Big Picture: Xi Jinping’s speech Wednesday at the Great Hall of the People struck a more outward-looking tone than his past anniversary addresses, casting the CCP as “the world’s largest ruling party with significant global influence” rather than focusing narrowly on domestic “national rejuvenation”. He simultaneously reaffirmed Beijing’s hardline stance on Taiwan, calling “reunification” the party’s “unwavering historical responsibility”.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: The roughly 40-minute address, delivered July 1 to mark the party’s 1921 founding, opened with Xi invoking “回顾我们党走过的光辉历程” (”looking back on the party’s glorious journey”) and calling on the whole party and people to advance “朝着全面建成社会主义现代化强国、实现中华民族伟大复兴的宏伟目标奋勇前进” (”toward the grand goal of fully building a modern socialist power and achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”).

• The Scope: Xi argued the CCP’s durability comes from qualities “其他政党和政治力量无可比拟” (”incomparable to any other political party or force”), listing traits such as “矢志追求真理” (unwavering pursuit of truth), “深深植根人民” (deeply rooted in the people), and “敢于善于斗争” (daring and skilled at struggle).

• The Themes: He warned that “世界进入新的动荡变革期，人类又一次站在何去何从的十字路口” (”the world has entered a new period of turbulence and change, and humanity again stands at a crossroads”), and stressed “强国必须强军” (”a strong nation must have a strong military”), calling for accelerating efforts to build “世界一流劲旅” (a “world-class force”).

• Between the Lines: On internal discipline, Xi used sharper language than in prior years, demanding the party “坚决清除一切损害党的先进性和纯洁性的因素、清除一切侵蚀党的健康肌体的病毒” (”resolutely eliminate all factors that damage the party’s advanced nature and purity, and purge all viruses that erode the party’s healthy body”). Taiwan’s government dismissed the Taiwan portion of the speech as “repeating old talking points”.

The Bottom Line: Xi is projecting confidence on two fronts at once: positioning the CCP as a global governance model while doubling down on Taiwan rhetoric and internal “self-revolution” language, signaling Beijing sees no need to soften its core positions even as it courts broader international legitimacy.

2. Beijing begins rebuilding its gutted military high command

The Big Picture: After more than a year of unprecedented purges left China’s Central Military Commission reduced to just Xi and loyalist Zhang Shengmin, reporting indicates Beijing has now started recomposing the commission, signaling Xi may be ready to move past the purge phase and rebuild the PLA’s top leadership structure.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: The CMC’s collapse accelerated after Gen. Zhang Youxia, then the top vice-chairman and second only to Xi in the military hierarchy, was placed under investigation in January alongside Gen. Liu Zhenli, following the earlier expulsions of Gen. He Weidong and Navy Adm. Miao Hua.

• The Scope: At its low point, the six-member CMC operated with only Xi as chairman and Zhang Shengmin, the military’s former anti-corruption chief, as vice-chairman, a situation analysts described as “the total annihilation of the high command”.

• The Rebuild: Zhang Shengmin was formally elevated to vice-chairman in October 2025 following the Fourth Plenary Session, marking the first concrete step toward reconstituting the body after the wave of dismissals.

• Between the Lines: Analysts had questioned whether Xi would wait until the 2027 Party Congress to fill the remaining vacant CMC seats. Signs that recomposition is underway now suggest he may not be waiting for the full congressional cycle to restore operational command capacity.

The Bottom Line: A CMC running on two members for over a year raised real questions about PLA operational readiness and chain-of-command clarity during a period of heightened Taiwan tension. Moves to fill out the command structure suggest Xi has finished consolidating loyalty and is shifting toward restoring functional military leadership, worth watching closely for who gets promoted next and what it signals about Taiwan contingency planning.

3. China’s “ethnic unity” law goes live, with a long arm aimed at Taiwan

The Big Picture: Beijing’s new Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law took effect July 1, formally extending Beijing’s assimilationist framework beyond its 56 recognized ethnic groups to explicitly claim Taiwanese and Hong Kong residents as part of a single “Chinese nation,” while also asserting jurisdiction over anyone abroad who challenges that. Taiwan responded with “strong condemnation,” warning the law effectively criminalizes dissent by foreigners.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: Passed by China’s National People’s Congress on March 12 and formally activated July 1, the 65-article law mandates Mandarin as the primary language in education and public life and requires schools to instill loyalty to the Communist Party.

• The Scope: Article 63 extends liability to organizations and individuals outside mainland China, explicitly including Taiwan and Hong Kong compatriots and overseas Chinese, who are deemed to “undermine ethnic unity” or “incite ethnic division”.

• The Response: Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and Foreign Ministry say the law could compel citizens toward pro-unification positions or expose them to prosecution simply for critical commentary, calling it a form of long-arm jurisdiction.

• Between the Lines: Beijing has openly defended its right to target people overseas under the law, removing any ambiguity about its extraterritorial intent just as concerns from the UN and rights groups mount.

The Bottom Line: This is a legal weaponization of identity politics. Beijing is now trying to codify Taiwanese “Chinese-ness” into domestic law, giving itself a formal pretext to pursue critics globally, not just at home.

4. Wang Yi tells Rubio to handle Taiwan with “utmost caution”

The Big Picture: In a Tuesday phone call, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi issued a pointed warning to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, saying “a slight move on the Taiwan issue could affect the whole situation.” That’s a sign Beijing is watching for any perceived shift in U.S. posture even amid a fragile trade truce.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: The call, disclosed by China’s Foreign Ministry on Wednesday, came as both sides continue trying to manage risks in the broader relationship.

• The Scope: Wang’s language framed Taiwan as the single most destabilizing variable in the bilateral relationship, above trade or tech disputes.

• Between the Lines: The timing, one day after China’s ethnic unity law took effect and around Xi’s anniversary speech, suggests Beijing is bundling legal, rhetorical, and diplomatic pressure on Taiwan into a coordinated push rather than isolated moves.

The Bottom Line: Beijing is signaling that any perceived U.S. tilt toward Taipei, whether arms sales, official contacts, or rhetoric, carries outsized risk to the broader U.S.-China relationship right now.

5. Reuters exposes top-level Russia-China military training pact

The Big Picture: New Reuters reporting shows China’s covert military training of Russian forces last year was personally approved by Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and directly involved at least four Russian and Chinese generals, a level of high-level sign-off that goes far beyond the rank-and-file training previously disclosed. The finding deepens alarm in Europe that Beijing’s support for Moscow’s war effort is institutionalized at the top of both militaries, not incidental.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: A classified Russian document seen by Reuters references an internal decree issued by Belousov in August 2025, under which a Russian armed forces delegation traveled to China to train at PLA facilities.

• The Scope: Documents name senior officers on both sides, including Russian Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who led the delegation, and Chinese Major General Li Jinsun, head of the PLA’s Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence. One course, held in Beijing in November, focused on radiological, chemical, and biological protection.

• The Signatories: The training framework was underpinned by a July 2 agreement signed by Russian Major General Rustam Khusainov and Chinese Senior Colonel Sun Dayun, according to the officials.

• Between the Lines: This builds on an earlier Reuters report that China secretly trained about 200 Russian personnel in drone warfare and electronic warfare, some of whom later fought in Crimea and Zaporizhzhia. Beijing has repeatedly denied direct involvement, calling the claims “entirely unfounded,” while the Kremlin has separately dismissed related reporting as misinformation.

The Bottom Line: The generals-level oversight described in the documents suggests Moscow-Beijing defense cooperation has moved from informal exchanges to an approved, institutional framework, exactly the kind of integration Western officials have long warned would blur the line between “no-limits partnership” rhetoric and direct battlefield support.

6. FCC’s expanded Chinese tech ban kicks in

The Big Picture: The FCC’s expanded ban on importing legacy Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, Dahua, and Hytera equipment takes effect in early July, closing a loophole that let older, pre-2022 models keep entering the U.S. market.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: The FCC voted June 26 to widen its original 2022 restriction, which had only barred new models from the five blacklisted Chinese firms.

• The Scope: The rule targets equipment used in public safety, government facilities, and critical-infrastructure surveillance, citing electronic-espionage risk.

• The Penalties/Limits: Previously purchased equipment already in use is grandfathered in, and the rule doesn’t retroactively cover older drone or router models.

• Between the Lines: This closes a workaround companies had used to keep buying legacy versions of banned gear, reflecting Washington’s broader push to scrub Chinese hardware from sensitive networks link by link.

The Bottom Line: The U.S. is tightening, not just maintaining, its tech-decoupling perimeter. The security-driven restrictions on Chinese hardware are expanding even as trade talks stay in a cooling-off period.

7. Chinese Coast Guard patrols east of Taiwan stay a live irritant

The Big Picture: Beijing’s decision to send Coast Guard vessels into waters east of Taiwan, a maneuver Taipei calls provocative, underscores that gray-zone pressure hasn’t paused even as diplomatic channels stay open.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: Chinese state media described the patrol as a special maritime traffic law-enforcement operation, launched in apparent response to a joint Japan-Philippines announcement.

• The Scope: Four Chinese vessels entered waters Taiwan considers restricted before being tracked and expelled by Taiwan’s Coast Guard.

• Between the Lines: Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo confirmed the military is coordinating closely with the Coast Guard, treating even non-military patrols as a security-relevant signal requiring intelligence sharing.

The Bottom Line: Beijing continues to use ambiguous, sub-military maritime assets to probe and normalize presence around Taiwan. That pattern is becoming a baseline stressor rather than an isolated incident.

Thank you for reading!

The Module 3 of the China OSINT course is now live, and we’re already halfway through the journey. If you’ve been thinking about joining, there’s still time to jump in and catch up. The course is designed for professionals to sharpen their skills and there is a rolling availability to enroll.

The Tinderbox in the Kennel

For years, the China-Japan relationship felt like a familiar, if uncomfortable, routine. Bitter arguments over history, tense stand-offs around disputed islands, but steady trade and dense business ties kept the rivalry contained. In Tokyo and Beijing, officials learned to treat flare-ups as passing storms in a long season of managed friction.

That balance began to slip in late 2025, when one sentence in the Japanese Diet landed in Beijing like a thunderclap.

The moment in the Diet

On a November afternoon, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi answered a question about a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan. A conflict across the Strait, she said, could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. That legal phrase opens the door to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces taking part in collective self-defense, including operations alongside U.S. forces.

In Tokyo, it sounded like a hard-line but logical extension of existing security laws, a response to a growing fear that any war over Taiwan would wash up on Japanese shores. In Beijing, it sounded like something far more serious: a direct challenge to the political foundation of the 1972 normalization, and a signal that Japan might fight for Taiwan.

Beijing decides this time is different

Chinese officials demanded that Takaichi retract her remarks, insisting she had crossed a “red line” by tying Japan’s security so explicitly to Taiwan. When no apology came, they began to treat the comment not as a gaffe but as proof that Japan was stepping into a more assertive, militarized role in the region.

Inside Beijing’s system, a narrative took shape. This was “neo-militarism,” backed by the United States, dressed up as legal technicality but aimed squarely at China’s core interest in Taiwan.

A new label for an old neighbor

Diplomacy has its own way of telling stories, through the words states choose to describe each other. In March 2026, Japan circulated a draft of its Diplomatic Bluebook, the annual foreign-policy guide that governments and analysts read closely for nuance.

China, it said, was now “an important neighboring country,” replacing a phrase used for nearly a decade that called the relationship “one of Japan’s most important bilateral relations.” Tokyo kept language about a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” but the semantic downgrade captured how ties had soured after the Taiwan remarks.

In Beijing’s telling, this was no accident of phrasing. It was another sign that Japan now saw China less as a special partner to protect and more as a difficult neighbor to manage.

Election night in Tokyo

While diplomats argued over adjectives, Japanese voters delivered their own verdict. In February 2026, Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party won a sweeping victory, securing a two-thirds supermajority in the lower house. It was, in effect, a domestic mandate for her tougher line on China and defense, including a plan to double military spending to 2 percent of GDP.

In Beijing, that outcome hardened the view that Takaichi’s stance was no mere posturing. A leader associated with historical conservatism and security hawkishness now had the numbers in parliament to reshape Japan’s posture for years.

Missiles on the map

A few weeks later, maps in Chinese planning offices began to look different. In March 2026, Japan deployed its first upgraded Type-12 land-to-ship missiles, dramatically extending their range to roughly 1,000 kilometers, enough to reach parts of mainland China and cover key routes around Taiwan.

Plans to station them on Yonaguni, Japan’s westernmost island, only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan, leapt out from the charts.

From Tokyo’s perspective, these were defensive tools meant to deter any Chinese move in nearby waters and reinforce the U.S.-Japan alliance along the first island chain. From Beijing’s standpoint, they looked like a new, pointed spear aimed at China’s naval access and Taiwan approaches.

A destroyer cuts through history

Then came the transit that read like a symbol. On April 17, a Japanese destroyer passed through the Taiwan Strait, a waterway China increasingly treats as something closer to its own to regulate.

The date was not random on Chinese calendars. It marks the anniversary of the treaty in which Qing-era China ceded Taiwan to Japan, a moment still remembered in Beijing as a deep national humiliation.

Whether Tokyo chose that day deliberately or not, the interpretation in Beijing mattered more than the intent. Chinese ministries and the Eastern Theater Command issued sharp denunciations, followed by combat-readiness patrols in the East China Sea and warships maneuvering near Okinawa. Every move Japan made to signal support for freedom of navigation fed into China’s worst-case picture of an assertive military neighbor joining any future fight over Taiwan.

Shrines, memories, and narratives

Shortly after the destroyer transit, Takaichi sent ritual offerings to Yasukuni Shrine, while other officials paid visits. These acts might once have been read mainly as gestures to domestic conservative supporters.

In China and South Korea, however, Yasukuni remains a potent symbol because it honors Japan’s war dead, including convicted Class-A war criminals.

This time, Beijing folded the shrine offerings into its broader narrative of “neo-militarism,” treating them not just as an insult to historical memory, but as another piece of evidence that Japan was tilting away from post-war restraint while rearming and revising its security doctrine.

Changing the rules of the arms game

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Welcome to today's briefing. The strategic landscape in Asia is shifting rapidly toward unscripted war-readiness, deep internal political restructuring, and high-stakes technological maneuvering. This week, we analyze an abrupt sweeping purge inside China's top legislative body, a major corporate supply chain push by Apple, and a massive geopolitical chess move in the AI arena.

1. REGIONAL SECURITY & GOVERNANCE

Beijing purges top military commanders, financial chief, and Politburo member

The headline: In a massive, unannounced escalation of China’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee has abruptly stripped six high-ranking military generals, a top financial regulator, and a sitting Politburo member of their lawmaker posts.

The details: The state-run Xinhua news agency confirmed the mass dismissals in an official notice but offered no explanation for the sweeping removals.

• The Military Hit: The purged brass is led by General Xu Xueqiang, head of the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Equipment Development Department—the powerful body tasked with overseeing the development, acquisition, and testing of hardware for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—who also concurrently served as the commander-in-chief of China’s manned space program.

• The Regional & Operational Scope: Beyond procurement, the purge took down General Li Fengbiao (political commissar of the PLA Western Theater Command), General Guo Puxiao (political commissar of the PLA Air Force), Lieutenant General Wang Kangping (Eastern Theater Command), Lieutenant General Zhang Minghua (Cyberspace Force), and Lieutenant General Yin Hongxing (Army).

• The Civilian Outliers: Mirroring the military purge, the state simultaneously ousted Li Yunze, the head of the National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA), and Ma Xingrui, the high-profile former Xinjiang Communist Party chief who holds a seat on the ruling Politburo.

Why it matters: A purge of this velocity across multiple theater commands and elite civilian regulatory bodies indicates that Xi Jinping’s anti-graft campaign is entering an aggressive new consolidation phase. Targeting the heads of hardware procurement, cyber operations, and financial regulation simultaneously suggests Beijing is actively rooting out systemic vulnerabilities, prioritizing absolute ideological loyalty and clean supply chains over administrative continuity as regional tensions simmer.

2. TECH NATIONAL SECURITY

Apple lobbies Washington to source memory chips from blacklisted Chinese supplier

The headline: In a high-stakes clash between global consumer technology supply chains and Western national security hawks, Apple has quietly approached the U.S. Commerce Department and other administration officials to allow it to buy memory chips from a blacklisted Chinese semiconductor giant.

The details: According to a fresh Financial Times investigation, financial pressures from skyrocketing memory and storage component costs—which have already forced Apple to hike retail prices on MacBooks and iPads—are driving the tech giant’s quiet lobbying campaign.

• The Target Vendor: Apple is targeting DRAM memory chips from Changxin Memory Technologies (CXMT) to relieve severe procurement bottlenecks.

• The Friction: While Apple is not legally barred from buying from them, the Pentagon placed CXMT on its Section 1260H Chinese Military Company blacklist over its alleged structural ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Why it matters: The development underscores the extreme difficulty of decoupling high-tech consumer electronics from Chinese manufacturing. If Apple succeeds in securing a green light or a tailored loophole, it directly undermines Washington’s broader Indo-Pacific technology containment policy, signaling to regional allies that economic profit margins can still override strict defense blacklists.

3. OPEN-SOURCE GEOPOLITICS

China’s Z.ai Triggers Wall Street Surge with Unrestricted Frontier Open-Source LLM

Driving the news: Beijing-based AI pioneer Z.ai—internationally rebranded from Zhipu AI—has fully open-sourced its new flagship large language model, GLM-5.2, under a highly permissive, unrestricted MIT license. The sudden release of the 753-billion-parameter open-weight model directly targets the global developer market just as the U.S. government escalates restrictions on foreign access to advanced proprietary software.

• The Geopolitical Countermove: The open-source download was deliberately made public immediately after the U.S. administration issued export curbs blocking foreign nationals from accessing top proprietary models like Anthropic’s Claude Fable 5. Because GLM-5.2 is an open-weight model, developers worldwide can now download, host, and alter the model’s weights locally on their own infrastructure, rendering it entirely immune to U.S. regional blocks or regional cloud shutdowns.

• The Performance Specs: Independent benchmark data from Artificial Analysis shows that GLM-5.2 leads all open models globally, outscoring DeepSeek V4 Pro and Google’s Gemini 3.1 Pro on multi-step agentic workflows and long-horizon tasks. Driven by a major new architectural optimization called IndexShare and a massive 1 million-token context window, the model ranks second globally on the web-development Code Arena—trailing only Anthropic’s top closed-source flagship.

The Financial Fallout: Market response to the release has been explosive. Traded under its parent name Knowledge Atlas Technology on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX: 2513), the company’s shares skyrocketed, driving its total market capitalization past the historic HK$1 trillion ($130B) milestone. The massive tech rally was further supercharged by a JPMorgan research note, which raised its target price by nearly 47% and projected a staggering 534% revenue surge for the company this year on growing international commercialization hopes.

Why it matters: GLM-5.2 marks a critical inflection point where open-source software becomes a weapon against geopolitical technology containment. By offering near-frontier capabilities entirely free of charge and geopolitical bottlenecks, Beijing is actively shifting bargaining power away from Silicon Valley. Furthermore, Z.ai’s engineering documents confirm the entire model was trained and optimized natively on Huawei Ascend chips, signaling that China’s top tier of “AI Tigers” can successfully scale frontier models while completely cut off from Nvidia’s high-end hardware.

4. ASYMMETRIC PROCUREMENT

210,000-Drone Shield Frozen: Taiwan’s Parliament Defers Fleet Legislation

The headline: Taiwan’s ambitious plans to build a 210,000-strong asymmetric drone shield have hit a major roadblock. A legislative alliance between the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) voted this week to stall the executive Cabinet’s Special Act for the Procurement of Indigenous Defense Unmanned Systems in the Legislative Yuan.

The details: The blocked bill is the central pillar of Taipei’s strategy to rapidly indigenize its defense footprint. The legislation seeks a NT$210 billion ($6.6B) special budget spanning August 2026 through 2031 to bankroll long-term procurement orders with domestic aerospace firms.

• The Fleet Blueprint: The blocked funding is tied to high-volume manufacturing long-orders, which includes roughly 208,200 coastal attack “suicide” loitering munitions, 1,446 long-range coastal reconnaissance drones, and 1,320 autonomous unmanned surface vessels (USVs).

• The Counter-Tactics: In response to the legislative freeze, the ruling DPP’s Convener, Chen Kuan-ting, announced a snap congressional inspection scheduled for Monday, June 29. The Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee will descend directly upon the Army’s newly minted Unmanned Systems Training Command (established April 10) to pressure opposition lawmakers by forcing public evaluation of the military’s frontline drone-warfare readiness and operational deficits.

Why it matters: Apart from this long-range NT$210 billion tier, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense is separately pushing ahead with a shorter-range commercial budget to buy 48,750 military-commercial grade drones domestically through 2027. The military insists on strict “non-red supply chains,” completely banning Chinese-made components. However, by freezing the massive, multi-year parent fund, opposition lawmakers are blocking local tech manufacturers from getting the financial guarantees they need to scale production lines. This leaves Taiwan’s coastal drone defense initiative trapped in a state of high uncertainty just as gray-zone encirclement operations intensify.

Reads

Why “China First” Will Fail — Foreign Affairs

The Long Arm of the Chinese Academy of Sciences — The Wire China

Welcome to today’s briefing. This week, the strategic focus in Asia centers squarely on asymmetric warfare and the race to adapt. From Taiwan's deep legislative paralysis over its domestic drone fleet to a rare U.S. Air Force critique of Beijing's stealth doctrine, technology and tactics are moving faster than the budgets meant to fund them.

1. AIR COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

US Air Force analysis claims China learned the “wrong lessons” from stealth

The headline: A newly released U.S. Air Force analysis argues that Beijing’s massive investments in countering Western low-observability aircraft suffer from a fundamental strategic flaw: they fixate entirely on technology while ignoring Western operational doctrine.

The details: According to a report by Maj. Derek Ecklebe at the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute, Chinese strategists treat stealth as an isolated, hardware-defined technical problem rather than part of an integrated, multi-domain system.

• The “Stealth Busting” Trap: China has poured massive resources into unproven low-frequency, passive, and terahertz sensors under the belief that better radar hardware can completely neutralize the U.S. advantage.

• The Platform Mirror-Image: The analysis notes that China’s new J-35 stealth fighter replicates features of the American F-35 but prioritizes basic hardware metrics over software adaptability and pilot modernization. Furthermore, domestic constraints like poor engine reliability (such as the WS-10) are limiting Chinese stealth sortie rates, a problem planners likely project onto U.S. platforms.

Strategic fallout: This misconception could skew deterrence calculations. If Beijing believes its new technological sensors have effectively “solved” Western stealth, Chinese leaders may become dangerously emboldened, underestimating the combined tactics, electronic warfare, and integrated command structures of U.S. airpower.

2. UNMANNED SYSTEMS & PROCUREMENT

Anduril eyes Nissan facility as Japan’s Terra Drone buys into Ukraine

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Beijing is significantly accelerating its cross-domain power projection, testing geopolitical limits with a series of coordinated maritime and aerial maneuvers. As China’s premier indigenous supercarrier sails through the Taiwan Strait and state media broadcasts advanced stealth fighter-drone pairings, pressure is mounting across the First Island Chain—particularly over a newly contested structure at Scarborough Shoal.

Meanwhile, in Washington, a landmark Supreme Court ruling has cut off a primary avenue for corporate liability for human rights violations by tech companies, redefining the legal landscape for tech operations.

1. SCOTUS slams door on overseas corporate liability.

The Big Picture: The U.S. Supreme Court has dealt a final blow to a 15-year-old legal battle, ruling in favor of tech giant Cisco Systems and shielding American corporations from being sued in U.S. courts over foreign human rights abuses.

The Details: The Case: Filed in 2011 by members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, the lawsuit alleged that Cisco custom-engineered China’s “Golden Shield” surveillance system. Plaintiffs argued Cisco knew the technology would be used to track, detain, and torture believers.

• The Ruling: Reversing a lower appeals court, the Supreme Court determined that U.S. courts are the wrong forum for actions orchestrated by foreign governments on foreign soil, even if a significant portion of corporate planning happened in the U.S.

• The Legal Mechanism: The ruling heavily restricts future applications of the 18th-century Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) against American companies operating globally.

The Dissent: Justice Sonia Sotomayor strongly disagreed with the majority, writing that the decision effectively “closes the courthouse doors” to corporate accountability, noting that arguments strongly suggested Cisco was aware its systems would facilitate torture.

Cisco’s Take: The company maintained that it simply sells standard networking infrastructure and cannot be held responsible for how sovereign nations choose to utilize it.

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2. Island-building fears reignite as China places new structures at Scarborough Shoal

The Big Picture: High-stakes maritime brinkmanship between Manila and Beijing has taken a sharp turn. Philippine defense officials are sounding alarms that Beijing may be laying the groundwork to turn the heavily contested Scarborough Shoal into a permanent military outpost, threatening to rupture long-delayed South China Sea Code of Conduct talks.

The Details:

• The Catalyst: The Philippine government lodged a formal diplomatic protest after detecting several large, unannounced floating structures inside the lagoon of Scarborough Shoal. Manila suspects these platforms, deployed by Chinese research vessels, are pretexts for permanent surveillance or communications installations.

• Beijing’s Pretext: The deployment follows China’s unilateral move to declare a 3,500-hectare “national nature reserve” over the reef—a designation Manila slams as a legal cover for full physical occupation.

• The Swarm: The Armed Forces of the Philippines reported tracking a staggering 82 Chinese coast guard and naval vessels within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) over the last month alone, with nearly half concentrated solely around Scarborough Shoal.

The Allied Counter: The U.S. responded by announcing a $13 million delivery of “Triton” autonomous underwater and surface vehicles to the Philippines. These long-endurance, solar-powered maritime drones are designed to dive under the surface to avoid detection while providing Manila with constant, unblinking reconnaissance on Chinese island-building activities.

The Bottom Line: Scarborough Shoal represents the final “strategic gap” for China in the central South China Sea, sitting just 200 kilometers from the main Philippine island of Luzon. If Beijing successfully converts the atoll into a militarized base alongside its existing outposts on Subi and Mischief reefs, it will secure a chokehold over regional shipping lanes and effectively freeze the Philippines out of its own EEZ.

3. China’s dual-carrier push: Fujian transits Taiwan Strait as Liaoning logs blue-water drills

The Big Picture: Beijing is flashing its naval muscle across the region. Just as China’s first carrier, the Liaoning, wrapped up an aggressive 40-day deep-sea mission, its newest and most advanced aircraft carrier—the Fujian—sent a sharp geopolitical signal by sailing directly through the sensitive Taiwan Strait.

The Details:

• The Fujian Transit: Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that the Fujian transited the strait on Tuesday, marking its first mission through the waterway since April. Taipei deployed joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to shadow the ship, releasing an overhead photo showing a clear but aircraft-free flight deck.

• The Liaoning Drills: Concurrently, the Liaoning returned to port in Qingdao after its 40-day combat deployment spanning the South China Sea and Western Pacific. This mission successfully tested integration with Type 075 amphibious assault groups and land-based tanker aircraft to significantly extend the PLA’s operational envelope.

• Why the Fujian Matters: Unlike its predecessors, the Fujian features a flat flight deck equipped with cutting-edge electromagnetic catapults. This allows it to launch significantly heavier, more heavily-armed jet fighters at a much faster rate, moving China closer to true U.S.-style power projection.

Between the Lines: The timing is surgical. The Fujian’s transit occurred just one day after Taiwan kicked off a critical five-day military exercise designed to simulate responses to a full-scale Chinese invasion. Furthermore, it follows a new grey-zone pressure tactic from Beijing: deploying Chinese coast guard vessels along Taiwan’s east coast to artificially project jurisdiction.

The Bottom Line: Beijing is no longer just experimenting with isolated carrier operations. By simultaneously demonstrating advanced far-sea combat integration with the Liaoning and flexing its premier, indigenously-designed supercarrier through the Taiwan Strait, the PLA is signaling that its “system-of-systems” maritime dominance strategy is approaching full operational maturity.

4. Beijing flexes full-stealth aerial combo: J-20S teams up with Attack-11 drone

The Big Picture: China’s state broadcaster (CCTV) broadcasted a deep-dive showcase on the PLA Air Force’s latest paradigm shift in aerial warfare, highlighting how the newly unveiled J-20S—the world’s first two-seat fifth-generation stealth fighter—is actively integrating with the Attack-11 (Gongji-11) stealth combat drone.

The Details:

• The “Loyal Wingman” Concept: State media highlighted the combat reality of teaming the J-20S with the Attack-11, a flying-wing stealth UAV designed for deep penetration strike missions.

• The Division of Labor: In this configuration, the front-seat pilot of the J-20S focuses on flying and traditional aerial combat, while the rear-seat officer serves as an airborne command-and-control operator, actively managing a swarm of Attack-11 drones ahead of the formation.

• System Strength: CCTV explicitly pitched this pairing as a showcase of the PLA’s “all-stealth aerial combat system architecture.” The drones act as forward sensory extensions—jamming enemy radars, scouting high-threat environments, or drawing missile fire—keeping the crewed mother ship safe from retaliation.

Why It Matters: While the U.S. Air Force continues to develop its own Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program to pair drones with next-gen fighters, Beijing is signaling it has leaped ahead in real-world deployment by fielding a dedicated two-seat stealth airframe (the J-20S) specifically built to manage the heavy cognitive load of drone-swarming operations. It complements China’s maritime dual-carrier flex by showing an equally advanced, cross-domain power projection capacity in the skies.

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To truly understand how Beijing views the sudden pause in the Middle East, one must look at the source. This comprehensive briefing synthesizes the strategic assessments of four senior leaders from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)—a top-tier intelligence and strategy think tank directly tied to China's Ministry of State Security (MSS).

Liao Baizhi (Director, Institute of Middle East Studies): A seasoned Arabist analyzing Middle Eastern regional shifts and security architecture.

Qin Tian (Deputy Director, Institute of Middle East Studies): Expert on the "Axis of Resistance" geopolitics and regional security dynamics.

Chen Wenxin (Director, Institute of American Studies): Expert on US foreign policy, domestic political factions, and grand strategy.

Li Yanan (Deputy Director, Institute of Middle East Studies): Focuses on regional structural conflicts, state-to-state diplomatic maneuvers, and non-state actors.

Chen Qinghong (Deputy Director, Institute of World Politics): Focuses on international order evolution and non-traditional security.

Part I: Beijing’s Anatomy of the Deal — A Major Yield by Washington?

On June 18, 2026, the US and Iran officially signed a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at the Bürgenstock Resort in Switzerland, temporarily halting 110 days of high-intensity warfare. For an administration that began the conflict declaring that nothing short of "unconditional surrender" would be accepted from Tehran, the final framework looks remarkably lopsided.

The link to WeChat post is below the paywall.

According to Director Liao Baizhi and Deputy Director Qin Tian, the terms of the MoU represent a massive asymmetry in concessions that heavily favors Tehran:

1. "Cash for Peace" and the Sanctions Reversal

Initially, Washington wagered that military strikes would collapse a fragile Iranian economy, forcing regime capitulation on the nuclear issue. Instead, the US is now offering a massive financial carrot to entice a pause:

A promised $300 billion "Iran Reconstruction Fund" and economic development plans driven by the US and regional partners.

The immediate unfreezing of up to $100 billion in Iranian overseas assets, with the Central Bank of Iran retaining total autonomy over the funds.

Immediate oil waivers: Washington has granted immediate sanctions waivers on Iranian crude oil, banking transactions, insurance, and shipping. This marks a total reversal of the long-standing US strategy to completely suffocate Iranian oil exports.

No "Sunset Clauses": If a final agreement is reached, Washington has promised to permanently dismantle both primary and "long-arm" jurisdiction sanctions. Crucially, this deal lacks the sunset clauses of the 2015 JCPOA—once lifted, they are gone for good.

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June 22, 2026

— Aadil Brar

In this afternoon’s edition: Seoul pitches a “pragmatic” nuclear roadmap to Trump, Taiwan starts assembling its U.S. SkyGuardians, the U.S. deploys its powerful Typhon missile system to Japan, and Beijing rolls out surgical export controls targeting the U.S. drone base.

1. Seoul’s “phased pragmatism” meets Trump

The News: South Korean President Lee Jae-myung presented U.S. President Donald Trump with a step-by-step roadmap for North Korean denuclearization during a G7 dinner in France.

• The strategy: Prioritize a near-term freeze on Pyongyang’s nuclear activities over an immediate, all-or-nothing disarmament demand.

• The concessions: Short-term benchmarks include halting additional fissile material production, blocking overseas weapons transfers, and stopping ICBM development, leaving full denuclearization as a long-term target.

• Trump’s take: He reportedly expressed openness, noting it “could be one way” forward and agreeing to consider it.

Why it matters: The proposal acknowledges that traditional sanctions have failed, especially since North Korea-Russia military cooperation over the Ukraine war has bypassed Western financial pressure.

• By the numbers: North Korea continues to produce enough fissile material to build 10 to 20 nuclear weapons annually, with its ICBM technology nearing final re-entry capability.

The Backlash: Pyongyang is not playing along. Kim Yo-jong issued a sharp statement via the KCNA denouncing the G7’s denuclearization calls as a direct violation of North Korea’s constitution, which legally enshrines its nuclear status. She declared the regime’s nuclear status “irreversibly finalized” and warned that tampering with it means “inviting disaster”.

2. Taiwan begins assembling U.S. “SkyGuardians”

The News: Taiwan has received its first two MQ-9B “SkyGuardian” high-altitude surveillance drones from the U.S., with assembly and ground testing currently underway on the island.

• The background: Part of a 2020 U.S. Foreign Military Sales agreement worth NT$21.7 billion (approx. US$685 million) for four MQ-9B SeaGuardian UAVs. The first two have been delivered; the remaining two are scheduled for delivery in 2027.

• The role: Unlike the U.S. military’s strike-first deployment, Taipei intends to use the drones for high-risk tactical reconnaissance and round-the-clock surveillance against Chinese gray-zone maritime activity.

Why it matters: The MQ-9B is designed for information dominance.

• Allied Integration: The drone can link directly to secure satellite communications networks shared among U.S. allies.

• Deterrence: If a cross-strait conflict erupts, Taiwan, the U.S., and Japan can instantly share real-time targeting telemetry to strike Chinese vessels trying to enforce a blockade east of Taiwan.

3. U.S. deploys powerful “Typhon” missile system to Japan

The News: The U.S. military is deploying its land-based Typhon midrange missile system to Kagoshima Prefecture in southwestern Japan for joint drills, breaking long-standing postwar taboos.

• The drills: The system will participate in Valiant Shield exercises at Kanoya Air Base from Monday through July 1, followed by Orient Shield drills in September.

• The transition: After the drills conclude, the system is slated to move to a U.S. military base in Japan in mid-October, which officials emphasize is a non-permanent deployment.

• The arsenal: Typhon can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of up to 1,600 kilometers—effectively placing parts of mainland China within striking distance—as well as SM-6 air defense missiles.

Why it matters: This is only the second time the Typhon system has been deployed to Japan, signaling a gradual shift in Tokyo’s “exclusively defense-oriented policy” to allow strategic offensive weapons for joint deterrence rehearsals.

• Beijing’s pushback: China has lashed out, calling the deployment “yet another example of Japan’s accelerated remilitarization” and warning that it harms regional strategic security and heightens confrontation risks.

4. Beijing warns of pop-up espionage and technical “jigsaws”

The News: China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has escalated its public counterintelligence campaign, warning that foreign spy services are exploiting pop-up advertisements to harvest user profiles and location data.

• The mechanism: Foreign agencies collude with commercial ad firms, routing data through neighboring regional nodes to bypass Chinese firewalls. When a user accidentally clicks an ad, their personal profiles, location, and behavior are sent back, allowing spy agencies to construct high-precision profiles for targeted recruitment.

• The case: The MSS publicized the case of a defense researcher, surnamed Zhang, who was recruited abroad under an academic consultancy facade by foreign operatives Bu and Mai. Zhang became suspicious after returning to China when they pried into military hardware research, leading him to self-report. He was spared prosecution, illustrating Beijing’s effort to incentivize public reporting.

The Big Picture: The MSS is warning citizens about cumulative, “jigsaw-style” intelligence gathering. Beyond digital profiling, foreign spies are reportedly using online platforms to recruit local actors for “paid photography” at air shows and electronics exhibitions to reconstruct stealth coating parameters and circuit designs.

5. Beijing hits back at U.S. drone and rare earth base

The News: China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has added 10 U.S. entities to its export control list, prohibiting the transfer of Chinese-origin dual-use items to them.

• The trigger: Retaliation for the U.S. Department of Defense’s expansion of its Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies list, which recently blacklisted tech giants Alibaba and Baidu. Beijing noted this violates the Xi-Trump consensus reached in May 2026.

• Government Ban: Concurrently, the Ministry of Finance announced a sweeping procurement ban prohibiting Chinese government agencies from purchasing products from 46 U.S. firms (including divisions of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing).

Why it matters: Beijing is surgically targeting the critical middle tier of the U.S. defense-industrial and rare earth supply chains:

• Rare Earth Squeezing: Target companies like MP Materials and USA Rare Earth are blocked from importing Chinese chemical extraction agents and refining tech, threatening domestic U.S. critical mineral supply chains.

• Drone Supply Disruptions: Drone manufacturers and component suppliers—including Teal Drones, Red Cat Holdings, IMSAR (radar), Aveox (brushless motors), and Jaia Robotics—face immediate cut-offs of lightweight composites, precision magnets, and marine sensor components.

• Tactical Mobility: Fleet vehicle provider Oshkosh Defense and satellite payload maker Ball Aerospace are hit with blocks on dual-use metallurgical inputs and optical processing sensors.

PDR (Pacific Defense Review)

• Seoul: President Lee Jae-myung secured a commitment from Pope Leo to actively consider a visit to South Korea, the DMZ, and potentially North Korea to foster peaceful engagement.

• Taipei: The Air Force’s fiscal 2026 defense budget proposal includes plans to develop an uncrewed aerial system capable of round-the-clock surveillance to track PLA gray-zone activity.

• Beijing: The Ministry of Finance’s sweeping procurement ban against 46 U.S. defense and tech firms will exclude U.S.-funded enterprises operating inside China.

• Washington: Department of Defense restrictions under the expanded Section 1260H list—which sparked Beijing’s retaliatory export controls—are scheduled to take effect on June 30, 2026.

Reads:

China Could Win Taiwan Without Fighting — Foreign Affairs

The Amari Bangkok, a hub for security diplomacy — Intelligence Online

Xi’s Enforcers Are Hunting Down Officials Who Consult Mystics and Borrow Too Much — WSJ

New Activity at Possible Chinese Intelligence Facilities in Cuba — CSIS

If you missed my earlier announcement, I’ve launched a new course: China OSINT Essentials.

This course is built for journalists, researchers, analysts, investigators, and anyone else trying to make sense of China through open-source information. The basic problem is simple: there is a huge amount of publicly available information out there, but finding it, verifying it, and turning it into something useful takes method, patience, and the right workflow.

Note: I will accept cryptocurrency payments for the course fee.

That is what this course is designed to teach.

Too often, people think of intelligence as something that depends mainly on classified sources. In reality, open-source intelligence plays a far bigger role than many assume. OSINT is often estimated to account for 75% to 80% of the information used in intelligence analysis, even if the exact number varies depending on the institution and mission. The point is not the percentage itself. The point is that open sources matter enormously — and the people who know how to work with them well have a real advantage.

That matters even more when it comes to China.

Anyone who has tried to research Chinese companies, military developments, influence operations, propaganda networks, or political narratives knows the challenge. Important information often sits across fragmented platforms, local databases, Chinese-language sources, archived pages, procurement notices, mapping tools, shipping records, satellite imagery, and obscure corners of the internet that do not surface in a simple English-language search.

China OSINT Essentials is meant to help close that gap.

The course includes over 4.5 hours of structured, self-paced video instruction and is divided into two tiers.

Tier 11 (Core) focuses on foundational skills. It is designed for people who want a reliable framework for researching China more effectively, especially if they are not sure where to begin or want to improve the rigor of their current process.

Tier 22 (Pro) goes further into advanced investigations. That includes satellite imagery analysis, deeper corporate and network research, and a fuller China OSINT toolkit for people who want to build more sophisticated workflows.

Across the course, I walk through how to search Chinese-language platforms that Google cannot reach, how to verify claims and track influence operations, how to investigate company data and business networks, and how to use imagery and other open sources to examine military and infrastructure developments.

My goal was not to make something theoretical. I wanted to build a course that is practical, field-tested, and immediately applicable.

I’ve reported for Newsweek, BBC, and TaiwanPlus, and I’ve spent years doing this work from Taipei. The methods in this course come directly from that experience: reporting under time pressure, following leads across languages and platforms, checking claims that are difficult to verify, and trying to build repeatable systems for understanding a fast-moving information environment.

I also know that many people interested in China research do not come from formal intelligence or investigative backgrounds. Some are journalists. Some are students. Some work in policy, risk, academia, due diligence, or civil society. What they often share is the same frustration: they know the information is out there, but they need a clearer process for finding it and making sense of it.

That is who this course is for.

I currently have a group of professionals enrolled, and the course is self-paced and will continue running throughout the year for those who want to join.

If you are interested, you can find the course details here:

This edition focuses on the quieter edges of the China-West-Taiwan rivalry, where espionage, technology, and supply chains increasingly overlap in plain sight. From Taiwan’s new tip portal to Beijing’s rebuttal of Five Eyes claims and the Jupiter Systems case, I see a shadow contest moving through websites, vendors, and civilian networks rather than only traditional state channels.

China-West espionage

Beijing turns the Five Eyes accusation back on the West

Chinese state media on Tuesday carried a sharp Defense Ministry rebuttal to Five Eyes claims that Chinese military intelligence has used online job platforms to recruit Western officials with access to classified material. In remarks published by Chinese state media, Defense Ministry spokesperson Senior Colonel Chen Xi called the allegation a politically motivated fabrication and said the Five Eyes countries had produced no evidence for what they describe as a “China spy threat.”

What makes this more than a routine denial, in my view, is that Beijing is trying to reverse the direction of the charge. Rather than simply rejecting the allegation, the Chinese side is arguing that the United States and its partners are the habitual practitioners of espionage, and Chinese official messaging in recent days has also warned that foreign intelligence services have tried to recruit photography enthusiasts inside China to take pictures of sensitive military sites and equipment.

I think that matters because it makes the episode look less like a clean case of accusation and rebuttal and more like a two-way espionage shadow war. The Five Eyes warning earlier this month described Chinese operatives as using professional networking and job sites to approach targets in government, defense, and related fields, while Beijing is now framing the West as using looser civilian channels of its own to gather military-related information inside China.

My read is that both sides are now fighting on two levels at once. One level is operational, where each suspects the other of using deniable civilian-facing tools to reach sensitive information. The other is narrative, where each wants outside audiences to see its own behavior as defensive and the other’s as manipulative, covert, and destabilizing.

What stands out to me most is how public all of this has become. Once intelligence accusations are pushed into official statements, alliance warnings, and state media messaging, the point is no longer just to stop a specific recruitment tactic. It is also to harden public opinion, justify tighter scrutiny, and normalize the idea that China and the Western intelligence bloc are locked in a persistent contest that now reaches into job boards, hobbyist networks, and the open internet.

Taiwan-China

Taiwan opens tip portal for mainland Chinese informants

What stands out to me here is that Taiwan is trying to turn China’s internal discontent into an intelligence opportunity, and it is doing so very publicly. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau launched an online “contact window” for Chinese nationals to submit political, military, economic, and social intelligence, saying the goal is to broaden its intelligence sources.

I read this as more than a technical move. Taipei is signaling that it believes there is a constituency inside China, or at least among Chinese abroad, that is disillusioned enough to cooperate if given a secure channel and clear operational guidance. The bureau has tried to lower the barrier by offering different instructions for users inside China and overseas, along with advice such as using foreign-brand devices, VPNs, and anonymous browsing.

To me, the bigger significance is that this is part of a widening information contest across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing previously launched its own reporting platform aimed at people accused of supporting “Taiwan independence,” and Chinese authorities said that system drew thousands of reports. That makes Taiwan’s new portal look less like an isolated initiative and more like a direct reply in an escalating battle over surveillance, narrative control, and psychological pressure.

Business and security

Behind the Screens

What struck me most in this piece is that the real story is not the screen technology itself but how quietly a small supplier can become embedded inside sensitive American systems before anyone treats it as a strategic problem. The Wire China reports that Jupiter Systems, a California maker of video wall processors used by every branch of the U.S. military, was acquired in 2020 by Beijing-based Suirui Group for $7.5 million without the deal being filed with U.S. authorities.

I think that matters because it shows how the front line of U.S.-China rivalry has moved far beyond the obvious targets like big chip firms or telecom giants. Once officials intervened, the Trump administration ordered Suirui to divest, and when that process stalled, a federal court placed Jupiter into receivership, which the article describes as the first such use of a court to enforce a presidential divestment order.

What I take from this is that Washington is now looking at ownership, procurement, and supply chain exposure as national security questions in their own right. The concerns in this case included Jupiter’s military customer base, Suirui’s ties to Chinese state-backed entities, Suirui’s reported pursuit of military business in China, and the risk that Chinese ownership could open a path to data access or disruption.

I also think the messiness of the unwind is part of the lesson. Even while U.S. authorities were trying to force a separation, Jupiter had increased sourcing from China after the acquisition, expanded staffing in Shenzhen, and still remained relevant enough that parts of the U.S. defense establishment resumed buying its products by late 2025 and again this year. To me, that is the clearest reminder that economic disentanglement sounds neat in policy speeches but looks much harder in the real supply chains that sit under national security.

Additional read: Foreign Affairs, “The False Promise of U.S.-China Stability,” argues that the current calm in U.S.-China ties under President Donald Trump is better understood as a shallow and fragile stalemate than as genuine strategic stability.

Je marche dans les ruelles de Da’an un soir d’été. L’air est lourd. Un groupe de jeunes me regarde un instant de trop. L’un murmure « Yindu ren ? » avant de détourner les yeux. Ce n’est pas un regard chargé d’une taxonomie raciale planétaire. C’est une désignation précise, presque administrative. Plus tard, dans un café de Yongkang, une conversation glisse sur les projets de recrutement de main-d’œuvre indienne. Les mots deviennent plus durs : sécurité, image du pays, préférence pour ceux qui « ressemblent à nous ». Mon corps, ma peau, mes traits ne déclenchent pas ici le même type de lecture automatique que dans d’autres espaces où la race est devenue une grille totale et morale. On me nomme « l’Indien », parfois « le Sud-Asiatique », plus rarement simplement « l’étranger ». Cette précision relative, cette absence d’un grand récit racial englobant, n’est pas un hasard. Elle révèle une tradition plus ancienne et plus persistante.

Cette tradition puise une partie de ses racines dans la coopération militaire allemande avec le gouvernement nationaliste des années 1920 et 1930. Des conseillers comme Max Bauer, Hans von Seeckt ou Alexander von Falkenhausen sont venus moderniser l’armée et l’industrie de guerre. Ils ont apporté des canons, des tactiques et surtout une certaine conception de l’ordre : l’État comme organisateur suprême, la hiérarchie comme condition de l’efficacité, la nation comme entité à discipliner. Plus tard, déjà à Taïwan, d’anciens officiers de la Wehrmacht ont été recrutés secrètement pour former les forces blindées du régime martial. Ces couches se superposent à la structure parti-État héritée du modèle léniniste et à un substrat plus ancien de distinction culturelle plutôt que raciale au sens biologique et universel.

Le résultat est une vision du monde qui reste fondamentalement étatique et particulariste. L’identité n’y est pas d’abord pensée à travers des structures universelles de l’expérience humaine. Elle passe par l’appartenance au projet national, à la discipline collective, à la raison d’État. L’autre, qu’il soit phénotypiquement différent ou culturellement éloigné, est rarement élevé au rang d’une variation au sein d’une humanité commune. Il reste un élément extérieur à gérer, à nommer précisément (« l’Indien », « le travailleur migrant », « le waiguoren ») et à subordonner aux impératifs de cohésion ou de sécurité.

D’autres traditions européennes ont suivi un chemin différent. Les Lumières françaises et le libéralisme anglo-saxon ont cherché à dégager des droits et des structures valables pour toute l’humanité, indépendamment des frontières étatiques. Certaines branches de la phénoménologie ont tenté de décrire les conditions universelles de l’expérience consciente. Ces approches, malgré leurs contradictions et leurs violences coloniales, portaient en elles une prétention au global. Elles pouvaient, en principe, traiter la différence comme une question qui concerne l’humain en tant que tel et non seulement le citoyen d’un État particulier. La tradition qui a influencé le ROC puis trouvé des échos en Asie de l’Est a préféré la construction étatique de l’identité. L’État n’est pas seulement un instrument : il devient le principal producteur de sens et de hiérarchie.

Cette différence se voit clairement quand on observe le Japon de l’ère Meiji. Lui aussi a massivement emprunté aux modèles prussiens pour sa constitution, son armée et son administration. La modernisation autoritaire et étatiste est devenue le chemin privilégié. En Chine continentale comme à Taïwan, malgré des trajectoires politiques opposées après 1949, la primauté de l’État-parti ou de l’État-nation sur l’individu et sur l’universel est restée forte. Même la démocratisation taïwanaise n’a pas entièrement effacé cette formation. Elle l’a transformée, rendue plus pluraliste sur certains plans, mais les catégories de différence restent souvent liées à l’appartenance nationale ou culturelle plutôt qu’à une ontologie raciale ou humaine globale.

C’est pourquoi une conception pleinement globale de la race, au sens d’une taxonomie universelle et biologisante applicable à toute l’humanité, n’a pas émergé ici de la même façon. La différence est pensée à l’intérieur d’un horizon étatique et particulariste. On peut observer du colorisme, des stéréotypes et des réactions xénophobes, surtout quand les échelles de migration changent. Mais ces réactions restent fragmentaires, instrumentales, rarement élevées au rang d’un grand système moral et scientifique qui structurerait toute la société et toute l’histoire. Elles ne produisent pas le même type de récit total que celui qui a dominé une partie de l’Occident.

Cette limite structurelle a des conséquences directes sur la question de la puissance globale. Une puissance globale, au sens plein, n’est pas seulement celle qui fabrique les puces les plus avancées, qui déploie des porte-avions ou qui signe des contrats d’infrastructure à travers le monde. C’est celle qui parvient à faire partager, au-delà de ses frontières, une certaine expérience du monde et de l’autre qui s’impose comme désirable ou au moins crédible. Or une tradition qui reste prisonnière d’une construction étatique de l’identité peine à proposer un tel horizon. Elle peut exercer de la contrainte économique ou militaire. Elle peut séduire par la performance technologique ou par des promesses de stabilité. Mais elle reste largement une puissance dans le monde plutôt qu’une puissance du monde.

Le débat actuel sur la course technologique entre les États-Unis et la Chine continentale rate souvent ce point. On compte les brevets, les usines de semi-conducteurs, les investissements dans l’intelligence artificielle. On oublie que la domination technique ne suffit pas à produire une hégémonie globale quand l’appareil perceptif et politique reste structuré par un particularisme étatique ancien. Taïwan elle-même, malgré son excellence technologique et sa démocratisation réussie, illustre à la fois la force et la limite de cette formation : elle a su transformer l’héritage autoritaire en une société ouverte sur de nombreux plans, mais elle reste une petite puissance dont l’influence normative dépend largement de son alignement avec des traditions plus universalistes.

La question n’est donc pas seulement de savoir qui gagnera la course aux puces ou aux modèles d’IA. La question est de savoir si la tradition qui structure encore largement les sociétés d’Asie de l’Est peut, un jour, penser et faire vivre un ordre du monde qui transcende son propre cadre étatique et historique. Tant que l’identité et la différence restent subordonnées à la construction étatique, la réponse reste négative. Même victorieuse dans la tech, cette tradition risque de produire une puissance impressionnante mais finalement régionale, capable de contraindre et de commercer, mais incapable de proposer une expérience du réel qui s’impose comme globalement désirable.

C’est ce que je vois, chaque jour, dans les rues de Taipei et dans les conversations des cercles d’analystes. Ce n’est pas une question de retard ou de manque. C’est une question de forme. Une forme étatique et particulariste qui, depuis les conseillers allemands des années 1930 jusqu’aux débats actuels sur la main-d’œuvre étrangère, continue de limiter la manière dont le monde est perçu et organisé. Et cette forme ne disparaîtra pas simplement parce que les usines tournent plus vite ou que les algorithmes deviennent plus puissants.

Note: Ce texte est une exploration phénoménologique en cours. Il ne prétend pas à l'exhaustivité historique ni à la démonstration empirique. Il s'inscrit dans une réflexion plus large que je développe sur l'endgame de la compétition sino-américaine : non pas seulement qui gagne en termes de capacité militaire, économique ou technologique, mais quelle tradition philosophique et politique est structurellement capable de produire un ordre mondial que d'autres sociétés peuvent habiter, adopter ou du moins reconnaître comme légitime. C'est cette question, plus que le compte des porte-avions ou des brevets déposés, qui me semble décisive pour comprendre ce qui vient. Le français de ce texte a été corrigé grammaticalement avec l'assistance d'un modèle de langage (LLM). Les idées, les observations et les arguments sont les miens.

This is a phenomenological exploration in progress, not a work of historical exhaustiveness or empirical proof. It is part of a broader reflection I am developing on the endgame of US-China competition: not merely who wins militarily or technologically, but which philosophical and political tradition is capable of producing a world order that others can inhabit and recognize as legitimate. That question, more than any patent count or carrier deployment, is what I believe will decide what comes next. The French version of this text was grammatically corrected with the assistance of an LLM. The ideas, observations, and arguments are my own.

Merci pour l’attention!

The China OSINT Course has officially started. I’m excited to begin sharing this training with students who want to build practical skills for researching Chinese sources, tracking narratives, investigating companies, and using OSINT methods in a China-focused context.

If you have been considering joining, there is still time to sign up. The course is self-paced, so new students can jump in and start working through the material right away.

Details on how to sign up:

Now, the newsletter continues.

The old “Chimerica” idea was always more of a hope than a plan, and that hope has largely collapsed. As Ben Kostrzewa put it, the world has moved away from a system where law and policy made it easy for capital, people, technology, and trade to flow freely across borders, and the supposed China-America economic fusion turned out to be, in his words, “chimerical.” That is the right word: what once looked like a durable partnership now looks more like a temporary illusion that was built on convenience, cheap capital, and selective optimism.

The bigger point is that this is not just about U.S.-China tension. It is about a broader shift toward economic security, political screening, and a much less naïve view of interdependence. For companies and investors, the message is blunt. The era of assuming that trade will outrun geopolitics is over, and anyone still planning as if the world is flat on economic issues is already behind the curve.

Washington stops pretending China’s corporate stars are just private companies

The Pentagon has added Alibaba, Baidu, and BYD to its list of “Chinese military companies,” pushing the roster to 188 entities and making clear that Washington now views a much wider slice of Chinese commercial power as strategically compromised. The official logic rests on China’s military-civil fusion system, which is a tidy way of saying the United States no longer believes China’s corporate giants can claim innocence while operating inside a political system built to serve state power when required.

This is not a full sanctions hammer, but it is still a serious hit. The designation raises reputational risk, complicates procurement access, and tells investors and partner governments that dealing with these firms now comes with a political odor that will not wash off easily. Bluntly, Washington has decided the “we are just normal companies” line is nonsense, and that judgment was probably overdue.

Xi goes to Pyongyang and brings one of the men who runs the palace

Xi Jinping’s June 8 to 9 visit to North Korea was his first trip there since 2019, and the symbolism was obvious. Reuters and other major outlets reported that Xi used the trip to pledge stronger ties with Kim Jong Un and to position China and North Korea as partners against “hegemony,” which is diplomatic language with all the subtlety of a brick.

The more interesting signal was who went with him. Cai Qi accompanied Xi to Pyongyang, and Cai is not some forgettable protocol aide hovering near the luggage carousel. He is Xi’s de facto chief of staff, a Politburo Standing Committee member, and one of the people who controls access, paperwork, messaging, and political discipline around the top of the system. When Xi brings Cai, he is saying the trip matters politically, not just ceremonially. In other words, Beijing was not dropping by for nostalgic revolutionary cosplay. It was showing that North Korea remains close enough to the core of Chinese power that Xi wanted one of his most trusted operators standing beside him.

That also says something uncomfortable about Beijing’s priorities. China talks endlessly about stability, but North Korea remains useful precisely because it is unstable in ways that can be managed and exploited. Beijing does not want Pyongyang fixed. It wants Pyongyang dependent, predictable enough, and firmly inside the tent. This was not a peace mission. It was power maintenance with flags and motorcades.

China’s coast guard move near Taiwan is intimidation dressed up as paperwork

After Japan and the Philippines said they would begin talks on delimiting their maritime boundary, China condemned the move and then sent coast guard patrols into waters east of Taiwan, later pairing that with a broader maritime control operation. The sequencing matters because it shows Beijing reacting to regional coordination the way it often does, with pressure, signaling, and legalistic theater.

This is the routine now. When neighboring states try to sort out disputes through talks, maps, and rules, Beijing acts as if that itself is provocative because it would rather preserve ambiguity and muscle its way through it later. Calling these operations “law enforcement” does not make them lawful or normal. It is coercion in a white hull and a bureaucratic press release. The irritating part for Beijing is that every stunt like this sells the same message to the region: cooperate more, because China clearly prefers dealing with countries separately when it can lean on them harder.

Reads

Trump 2.0: Is China Filling the Void? — Yun Sun (China Leadership Monitor)

Satellite imagery published by Reuters on May 29 reveals the most significant expansion of China’s nuclear ground infrastructure in decades: a sprawling complex of launch pads, bunkers, and communications nodes built across thousands of kilometers of northwestern desert. The revelation is the latest chapter in a broader, years-long transformation of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) across western China.

Satellite images have revealed that China is constructing an extensive network of more than 80 launch pads, bunkers, and communications nodes near its nuclear missile silos in the Hami basin of eastern Xinjiang. The infrastructure clusters around two large octagonal military complexes located 140 and 230 kilometers from the silo fields, with a third structure further south near the Lop Nur nuclear test site. Five security scholars interviewed by Reuters agreed the infrastructure broadly could support China’s nuclear programme, as well as other military purposes, though they cautioned that key details remain unknown, including the specific weapons China might deploy at the launch pads.

More than 80 pads are assessed as likely platforms for China’s expanding fleet of mobile missile launchers and air-defense batteries, while the complexes also feature electronic warfare nodes, satellite communications facilities, and hardened weapons depots.

Hans Kristensen, director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project, said that while it was difficult to conclude how the various installations would be used, “it is hard to rule anything out”. Crucially, Kristensen noted that the United States and Russia rely on a combination of sheer numbers of silos, their relative isolation, and hardened construction to deter a first strike, rather than extensive missile defense. China’s extensive defensive network near its silos potentially sets Beijing apart from both powers. “I’ve never seen anything quite like it,” Kristensen said. “It’s an extraordinary effort”.

This author confidently identified two of the three silo sites referenced in the Reuters report through open-source analysis of the Hami field. The first is located at 41°13’26.41”N, 91°30’1.65”E (Site 1). The second sits approximately 50 kilometers to the south at 40°25’32.79”N, 91°15’0.02”E (Site 2), consistent with the dispersed spacing characteristic of China’s silo fields, which are designed to complicate an adversary’s targeting calculus.

Construction at Site 1 began sometime in 2022, while construction at Site 2 began in 2021.

The Hami field spans approximately 396 square miles and is assessed to contain around 110 silos. The third site within the Xinjiang complex has not yet been independently confirmed.

I remain a little skeptical about the third location as it appears to be in the early stages of construction.

Site 1: 41°13’26.41”N, 91°30’1.65”E (Dated: 2025-09-11)

Site 1: 41°13’26.41”N, 91°30’1.65”E (Dated: 2026-05-26)

The Reuters revelation connects to a broader pattern of PLARF expansion documented in earlier original reporting for The Diplomat in October 2025, which found a new PLARF brigade taking shape near Golmud city on the Tibetan Plateau. That site features a central base compound linked by new roads to multiple prepared concrete launch pads in the configuration characteristic of road-mobile missile brigades. The Golmud site, under PLARF Base 64 headquartered in Lanzhou and associated with the 647th Missile Brigade, is assessed as likely deploying the DF-26, a dual-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile with a 4,000km range. Two officials from an Asian country confirmed the Golmud installations are linked to the PLARF’s broader force expansion and expressed concern about implications for India and Taiwan. Taken together, the Xinjiang silo network and the Tibetan Plateau brigade represent a geographic pincer: fixed ICBM deterrence in the north, and flexible road-mobile reach across South and Southeast Asia from the west.

Site 2: 40°25’32.79”N, 91°15’0.02”E (Timelapse)

Site 2: 40°25’32.79”N, 91°15’0.02”E (Dated: 2024-02-09)

The disclosures build on a drumbeat of escalating revelations. A Pentagon draft report in December 2025 assessed that China had likely loaded more than 100 solid-fueled DF-31 ICBMs across its three main silo fields at Hami, Yumen, and Ordos, marking the first time Washington had put a specific deployment figure on record. China is on track to surpass 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, a pace faster than any other nuclear-armed state. Beijing has consistently denied these developments contradict its no-first-use doctrine and pledge to maintain forces “at the minimum level required for national security”, though the Pentagon has noted China is pursuing an “early warning counterstrike” posture and has shown no appetite for arms control talks.

Honest assessment: Much remains unknown about the intended purpose of these structures. There is a clear military dimension, with assets observed moving in and out. As with this author's earlier research on the Golmud area, a pattern is emerging of unusual new structures that appear linked either to conventional military forces, including storage and logistics, or to nuclear infrastructure such as rail connections and silo missile systems.

A lot happened in Asia in the last 24 hours, and most of it connects. Xi Jinping is preparing to travel to Pyongyang, extending a diplomatic hand to Kim Jong Un days after shaking Trump's in Beijing. Trump, returning from that same summit, says he will call Taiwan's president, a move that would shatter nearly five decades of protocol and test just how durable any understanding he reached with Xi actually is.

Meanwhile, Jensen Huang is in damage-control mode, conceding that Huawei has largely taken Nvidia's place in the world's second-largest economy while insisting the door is not yet closed. Taken together, today's stories are less a set of isolated developments than a single, sprawling argument about who gets to set the rules in Asia and who is being left out of the room where those rules are made.

Xi Eyes Pyongyang: Beijing’s Korean Gambit

Chinese President Xi Jinping may visit North Korea as early as next week, according to South Korean officials cited by Yonhap, one of the most consequential diplomatic signals on the Korean Peninsula in years. The timing is deliberate: it follows Xi’s summit with President Trump in Beijing last week, where both leaders affirmed a “shared goal to denuclearize North Korea” in language notable for its vagueness and absence of any enforcement mechanism.

The groundwork was laid in April, when Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to Pyongyang and met Kim Jong Un directly, an unusually elevated encounter, while Chinese advance teams have since conducted protocol preparations in the North Korean capital. A state visit now would formalize what Beijing has been quietly constructing: a position as the indispensable broker between Washington and Pyongyang, allowing Xi to extract concessions from both sides while controlling the pace of any diplomatic opening.

Seoul have responded with careful diplomatic language, calling on China to “play a constructive role” on the Peninsula, barely concealing its unease that a Beijing-mediated track could route Korean Peninsula diplomacy entirely around South Korea. For the Trump administration, hungry for a foreign policy headline on North Korea’s nuclear program, the arrangement may prove difficult to resist. That is, of course, precisely why Beijing is offering it.

Trump and Lai: A Call That Would Break 47 Years of Protocol

U.S. President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that he would speak with Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, a statement that, if followed through, would mark the first direct conversation between a sitting U.S. president and a Taiwanese leader since Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. The last time a U.S. leader publicly acknowledged speaking to Taiwan’s president was in December 2016, when Trump, then president-elect, accepted a congratulatory call from President Tsai Ing-wen, which itself was a break from four decades of protocol that prompted China to lodge a formal diplomatic protest and prompted Wang Yi to dismiss it as “a petty trick by Taiwan.” That was between a president-elect Trump and Tsai. A sitting president calling Lai would be a categorically different, and far more consequential, provocation.

The timing and context are critical. Trump made the remark aboard Air Force One on the return flight from his Beijing summit with Xi, telling reporters he needed to speak to the person “running Taiwan” about arms sales. That framing is significant: presenting a call with Lai as transactional, centered around weapons procurement, provides Trump with diplomatic cover. The call is purely business, not a policy statement on Taiwan’s status. Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister welcomed the prospect, calling it “a very good and rare opportunity.” Lai, for his part, has said he would use any such conversation to tell Trump directly that China, not Taiwan, is the party undermining stability in the strait.

Beijing’s reaction will be the key variable. In 2016, China’s response was deliberately restrained; Xi was calculating and did not want to antagonise an incoming administration. The dynamic in 2026 is fundamentally different: Xi has just hosted Trump, secured a joint denuclearization pledge on North Korea, and extracted at least implicit U.S. caution on Taiwan independence from the Beijing summit communique. A Trump–Lai call now arrives as a direct challenge to whatever understanding the two leaders reached in Beijing, and China’s response this time is unlikely to be so measured. The question isn’t whether Beijing protests, but how loudly they do so, and whether Trump uses Lai as leverage or genuinely intends to recalibrate U.S.–Taiwan relations after a week of appearing to favor Xi.

Huang Concedes China, But Won’t Walk Away

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has acknowledged that the company has “largely conceded” China’s advanced AI chip market to Huawei, a striking admission that crystallizes the cost of two years of escalating U.S. export controls. Huawei’s Ascend 910B processors have become the de facto standard for Chinese AI firms cut off from Nvidia’s flagship hardware, with Huawei on track to capture the largest share of China’s AI chip market in 2026, its sales up at least 60 percent year on year.

Yet Huang is not retreating entirely. Speaking this week, he argued that China will eventually open its market to U.S. AI chips, framing it as an economic inevitability: “The Chinese government has to decide how much of the local market it wants to protect and how much of the local market it wants to expand with more AI capacity.” Nvidia is also pursuing a license to resume sales of its H20 chip, a scaled-down GPU designed specifically for the Chinese market, and has received signals from Washington that approvals could follow.

The broader warning buried in Huang’s remarks deserves more attention than it has received. He has long cautioned that ceding the Chinese market does not simply cost Nvidia revenue; it actively cultivates a Huawei capable of exporting its AI stack globally, replicating China’s Belt and Road infrastructure model in the technology domain. Washington appears to be slowly recalibrating, but the market share Nvidia have surrendered in the interim may prove very difficult to claw back.

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The Week Xi Jinping Hosted the World — and Won

I’ve spent time in rooms where power is performed rather than exercised. This week in Beijing, Xi Jinping did both.

In the span of seventy-two hours, the Chinese president received Donald Trump and then Vladimir Putin, the man whose invasion of Ukraine made China Russia’s indispensable economic partner. The backdrop was the US-Iran war, which has sharpened the strategic importance of every energy and trade conversation now taking place in Asia.

Putin arrived in Beijing for his 25th official visit to China and was greeted with a formal welcoming ceremony outside the Great Hall of the People. He brought a large delegation, including five deputy prime ministers, eight ministers, and several business executives. The agenda covered bilateral relations, trade, energy cooperation, the Ukraine conflict, and the war between the US and Iran. The two leaders are also expected to sign a joint statement, while Putin later meets Premier Li Qiang to discuss trade and economic cooperation.

The relationship is not just diplomatic theatre. Bilateral trade between Russia and China topped $240 billion in 2023, more than doubling pre-Ukraine war levels, and China now takes roughly half of Russia’s crude oil exports.

One other detail matters here. FT reported that Xi privately told Trump that Putin might regret invading Ukraine, but both China and the US denied that account. That denial matters less than the fact that the story was even plausible enough to shape the diplomatic conversation around this visit.

What Xi and Putin Are Really Discussing in Beijing

Putin’s meeting with Xi in Beijing is being sold as routine diplomacy, but the agenda is doing the real talking. The two leaders are expected to cover bilateral relations, trade, energy cooperation, the US-Iran war, and Ukraine, which is a fairly precise way of saying they will discuss the pressure points now shaping the Eurasian order.

Energy sits at the centre of it. Russia wants to lock in longer-term demand from China, especially as the Middle East war keeps markets nervous, while Beijing wants a reliable supply at terms that still work in its favor. Trade is the other anchor, with Moscow leaning harder on China than at any point since the Ukraine war began.

Putin and Xi will discuss the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which has kind of stalled due to negotiations over the gas price.

Ukraine will be there too, even if Beijing avoids any public pressure on Moscow. And behind the formal language, this visit is still about the same thing it has always been about: proving that neither side needs to say too much in public because both already understand the value of the relationship.

Lai Ching-te to Trump and Xi: Taiwan’s Future Is Not Yours to Decide

The timing was not accidental. On the second anniversary of his inauguration, with Vladimir Putin sitting across from Xi Jinping just across the strait in Beijing, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te took to the podium in Taipei today to deliver a message aimed squarely at both capitals — and Washington.

“Taiwan’s future cannot be decided by external forces,” he said, “nor can it be held hostage by fear, division, or short-term interests. Taiwan’s future must be decided jointly by its 23 million people.” It was careful language, but the audience understood it perfectly. This was a direct response to Trump, who last week warned Taiwan against declaring independence after his Beijing summit with Xi, and who has been sitting on a $14 billion arms sale to Taipei, describing it openly as a negotiating chip with China.

Lai’s position has been consistent since he took office. He argues that Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent democratic nation and that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, meaning there is no “Taiwan independence issue” to resolve because independence already exists as a fact. Beijing, which labels him a “troublemaker” and a “destroyer of cross-strait peace,” sees it differently. China has not ruled out using force to bring Taiwan under its control and has steadily increased military pressure around the island since Lai came to power.

What makes this week different is the context. Lai is no longer just managing Beijing’s pressure. He is now managing Washington’s ambiguity too. Trump’s comments after the Xi summit introduced a new variable: an American president willing to use Taiwan’s security as a lever in a broader negotiation, at the exact moment China is reinforcing its position with Russia and watching the US consume military and political capital in Iran. Lai’s speech today was a reminder that Taipei has read the room, and is not planning to quietly accept whatever arrangement Washington and Beijing work out between themselves.

Democracy, Lai said, is not “a gift that fell from the sky.” For anyone paying attention to what is happening in Beijing this week, that line carried more weight than it might ordinarily.

Meanwhile, here are some other stories from the region.

Malaysia seeks compensation over scrapped Norwegian missile deal

Malaysia says it is seeking more than US$250 million in compensation from a Norwegian firm after the cancellation of a missile deal, an unusually sharp escalation in a procurement dispute that could ripple into defence ties and future contracting confidence. The case adds another layer to Southeast Asia’s broader push to diversify suppliers while managing cost, credibility, and geopolitical exposure.

Thailand tightens visa-free entry amid crime concerns

Thailand is cutting visa-free stays for more than 90 nationalities, citing concerns over foreign-related crime and abuse of the policy, a move that could affect tourism flows and regional travel patterns. The policy shift also shows how governments are increasingly using border rules as a domestic security signal, not just a tourism tool.

I rarely recommend work by other authors in Substack, but this revelation by Netaskari gives us a rare look into China’s surveillance of foreigners. I highly recommend following the Substack.

NetAskari

Sharp Eyes: Mass surveillance of foreigners in China - Part 1

In our line of work, you have to be lucky sometimes. In a previous post we explained how unsecured and forgotten dashboard and web pages can reveal a lot about China's security and surveillance system. Now, we can reveal a much more detailed insight into how such a system could look like in real life…

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2 months ago · 48 likes · 2 comments · NetAskari

Thank you!

Donald Trump’s 2026 visit to China produced plenty of optics and carefully chosen language, but no clearly documented major agreements. The most revealing part of the trip was not what was signed, but what Xi Jinping and Trump said in public, in side meetings, and in post‑summit interviews.

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