ASIA COMMUNIQUE
Strategic Developments in Defense, Security & Geopolitics
Hello Readers,
February 2, 2026
Asia experienced a series of significant security and defense developments over the past 48 hours that signal deepening strategic realignment and accelerating military modernization across the region.
The world is changing, and you feel the jolt of this tumultuous journey. No two times are the same, and no two journeys are the same. Life is all about choices. If you choose to stay — or you choose to roll the dice — these are choices. But great stories come from different choices, unfortunately, not the safest of paths. You can just do things, as the internet slang goes. Trust me, you really can. Back to geopolitics.
Russia explicitly reinforced its strategic alignment with China on Taiwan while expressing concern over Japan’s militarization. Singapore announced major defense capability upgrades, including a $2.3 billion maritime patrol aircraft acquisition, while simultaneously launching a national civil-military resilience exercise amid cyber threats. Pakistan advanced its Chinese submarine acquisition program—a landmark development that reshapes the South Asian naval balance. Meanwhile, China faces a credibility crisis in South Asia, with the Belt and Road Initiative stalled by security disruptions and failed diplomatic leverage. These developments reveal a region in flux, where alliance architectures are shifting, military modernization is accelerating, and economic power is proving insufficient without security capacity.
RUSSIA-CHINA COORDINATION ON TAIWAN: EXPLICIT ALIGNMENT
The Statement
On February 1-2, 2026, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu conveyed to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that “Moscow continues to support Beijing over Taiwan, as Russia keeps a close eye on Japan’s ‘accelerated militarization.’” The statement was reported by the Russian state news agency TASS and marks an explicit reinforcement of the Russia-China “no limits” strategic partnership declared in February 2022.
Strategic Significance
The timing and tenor of Shoigu’s statement carry specific weight. Russia, engaged in Ukraine and facing Western sanctions, demonstrates no intention of adopting strategic ambiguity on Taiwan—unlike the Trump administration. Moscow’s explicit backing of Beijing’s Taiwan position serves multiple purposes: reinforcing the Russia-China entente, signaling that the Ukraine crisis has not divided their broader strategic alignment, and warning the West (particularly the U.S.) that Taiwan coercion carries costs for Japan and the broader Indo-Pacific alliance structure.
The additional message—Russian concern about Japan’s “accelerated militarization”—reflects Moscow’s assessment that Tokyo’s defense spending increases (now approaching 2% of GDP) represent part of a coordinated U.S.-Japan containment strategy. Russia interprets Japan’s military expansion as a proxy challenge to both Beijing and Moscow, requiring explicit coordination in response.
Implication: Beijing now has explicit Russian support for coercive Taiwan action, reducing the diplomatic cost of escalation in the Taiwan Strait from Moscow’s perspective.
SINGAPORE’S DEFENSE MODERNIZATION SURGE: MARITIME POWER PROJECTION AND DOMESTIC RESILIENCE
P-8A Poseidon Acquisition
On January 31, 2026 (announced February 2), the U.S. State Department approved a potential $2.316 billion Foreign Military Sale to Singapore for up to four Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. The package includes eight Mk 54 Mod 0 lightweight torpedoes, advanced mission systems (AN/APY-10 maritime surveillance radar, AN/AQQ-2(V) acoustic systems, MX-20HD electro-optical/infrared turrets), identification systems, electronic warfare packages, and comprehensive training and sustainment support.
The acquisition represents Singapore’s systematic recapitalization of its maritime surveillance fleet, replacing aging Fokker 50 airframes (in service since the early 1990s) with a platform explicitly designed for anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness in the contested waters of the South China Sea. The P-8A’s endurance (6,000+ nautical miles) enables Singapore to conduct deep-ocean surveillance and coordinate with allied naval forces across the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca.
Domestic Resilience Initiative
Simultaneously, on February 1, 2026, Singapore launched Exercise SG Ready (ESR) 2026—the third edition of its national Total Defence exercise—involving over 1,000 organizations in simulated activities focused on digital connectivity degradation and prolonged power outages. The exercise runs February 1-15 and is explicitly framed as preparation for “geopolitical uncertainties and hybrid threats.”
Coordinating Minister for National Security K Shanmugam’s Total Defence message emphasized that Singapore’s critical infrastructure came under cyberattack in 2025 by “a highly sophisticated actor” and that “foreign parties had tried to divide the community and undermine trust in the government.” The exercise tests organizational readiness for infrastructure disruption and social cohesion under stress.
Strategic Implication
Singapore’s dual emphasis—on maritime military capability projection and domestic cyber-resilience—reflects awareness of multi-layered threats: external (South China Sea assertiveness, naval challenges) and internal (cyberattack, information warfare, infrastructure disruption). The P-8A acquisition, combined with Singapore’s existing submarine fleet (six Type 218SG submarines with German partners), creates a comprehensive maritime awareness picture extending from the Malacca Strait to the central Indian Ocean.
PAKISTAN’S SUBMARINE PROGRAM ADVANCES: RESHAPING SOUTH ASIAN NAVAL BALANCE
Fourth Hangor-Class Launch
On December 17, 2025, Pakistan’s fourth Hangor-class submarine, PNS Ghazi, was launched at Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Group in Wuhan, China—with the announcement becoming widely reported in February 2026. This milestone marks a significant acceleration in Pakistan’s submarine procurement under its $5 billion agreement with China for eight Hangor-class diesel-electric submarines.
The Hangor-class (based on China’s Type 039A Yuan-class) features air-independent propulsion systems enabling extended underwater endurance, advanced stealth design, and weapon systems capable of engaging targets at “standoff ranges.” Under the agreement, four submarines are being built in China while the remaining four will be constructed at Pakistan’s Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works under technology transfer arrangements, designed to strengthen Pakistani shipbuilding expertise.
Projected Timeline and Capability
Pakistan’s Navy Chief Admiral Naveed Ashraf stated that the first Hangor-class submarine is expected to enter service in 2026, with all eight expected to be operational by 2028. While the original timeline projected delivery between 2022-2023, the program has experienced delays typical of large military procurement programs. Three submarines have now been launched, with all four being built in China, currently undergoing sea trials and “final stages of handover.”
The Hangor acquisition fundamentally alters South Asia’s undersea balance. Pakistan, which currently operates aging diesel-electric submarines acquired from France (1990s-era Agosta-class), will obtain a modern fleet with substantially greater endurance, stealth, and weapon range. India’s naval advantage—currently built on three nuclear submarines and three diesel-electric boats (French, German, Russian designs)—faces new competitive pressure from Pakistan’s deep-strike capability.
Strategic Drivers
Admiral Ashraf characterized the Hangor deal as reflecting “shared strategic perspective, mutual trust and a long-standing partnership” with China, extending beyond hardware to “shipbuilding and training, improved interoperability, research initiatives, technology sharing, and industrial cooperation.” The submarines will patrol the North Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, enhancing Pakistan’s A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) capabilities and extending power projection toward the Middle East.
Implication: Pakistan’s submarine fleet modernization signals Beijing’s confidence in Islamabad as a strategic partner and rebalances the naval competition in the Indian Ocean, where India has traditionally enjoyed superiority.
CHINA’S SOUTH ASIA CREDIBILITY CRISIS: ECONOMIC POWER WITHOUT SECURITY CAPACITY
The CPEC Failure Rate
A comprehensive analysis released February 1, 2026, reveals that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—Beijing’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative project in South Asia—is only 40% complete after a decade. Of the $60 billion committed since 2015, only $27 billion has been realized, with projects repeatedly delayed by security threats, political instability, and governance challenges.
In Pakistan’s Balochistan province, three critical unfinished projects remain under persistent attack: the Gwadar East Bay Expressway, the Hub Coal Power Project (1,320 MW), and the Nokundi-Mashkhel-Panjgur Road. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has conducted 71 attacks across 51 locations in Pakistan by May 2025, directly targeting Chinese nationals and infrastructure. Between 2013 and 2023, the BLA killed at least 20 Chinese nationals and injured 34.
Afghanistan’s Destabilization
In Afghanistan, China’s strategic investments exceed $10 billion and include the Aynak copper mine (delayed 16 years due to NATO-Taliban conflict before Chinese extraction began in 2025), the Amu Darya oil contract spanning three northern provinces, and a planned $10 billion lithium mining project. Yet in November 2025, two consecutive attacks on the Afghan-Tajik border (November 26 and 30) killed seven Chinese nationals, signaling both the insecurity of these zones and the persistence of anti-Chinese militant activity.
The Security-Development Nexus
The analysis identifies what it terms the “security-development nexus”: economic power, without security capacity and external military capability, cannot translate into governance and influence. Unlike the United States, which can project military force to protect its infrastructure investments, China lacks the institutional capacity and strategic doctrine to conduct external security operations. This fundamental asymmetry exposes China’s Belt and Road Initiative to disruption in unstable regions where security is the prerequisite for economic activity.
The failures in Afghanistan and Pakistan extend beyond financial and logistical delays. They have damaged Beijing’s narrative of benevolent, efficient development and strategic prestige. Recent inconclusive Taliban-Pakistan negotiations—where China attempted to mediate—further demonstrate Beijing’s limited leverage over its two key South Asian partners to mitigate tensions and safeguard its economic projects.
Implication: China’s model of projecting geopolitical influence through economic development, without accepting the strategic costs of security provision, faces fundamental structural limitations. Success or failure in managing the CPEC and Afghanistan investments will shape Beijing’s regional hegemony and global leadership credibility.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Cambodia’s UNCLOS Accession: Opening New South China Sea Disputes
Cambodia formally ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in late January 2026, after a 40-year delay in joining the international maritime framework. The decision opens a new diplomatic front with Thailand over disputed oil fields off Koh Kood Island, which becomes subject to UNCLOS maritime boundary provisions. This represents a significant shift in Cambodia’s strategy toward multilateral maritime law—a development potentially advantageous to maritime claimants (like the Philippines and Vietnam) in South China Sea disputes, though Cambodia’s relationship with China may complicate its practical application.
India’s Defense Budget: Insufficient Modernization
India announced its FY25-26 defense budget allocation at INR 6.81 trillion ($77.8 billion) on February 1, 2026. While this represents budget growth, defense analysts assess it as insufficient to meet India’s military modernization requirements amid rising Chinese capabilities, Pakistan’s submarine expansion, and Indian Ocean security demands. The budget allocation reflects continued constraints on India’s defense spending relative to China’s more robust military investment.
As I wrote on X, New Delhi has accepted the fate of the new status quo vis-à-vis China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Here is an op-ed by Mihir Sharma in Bloomberg that’s worth reading: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-01-28/india-is-resigned-to-a-new-status-quo-with-china.