Asia Communique

What Did a Chinese Expert Say About India-Taiwan Relations | Philippines Steps Up Secret Defense Talks With Taiwan |

Aug 26, 2025

Hello Readers,

For today’s newsletter, I’ve translated an in-depth explainer by a Chinese expert published on Guancha about India-Taiwan relations. The piece analyzes why New Delhi rejected China’s inclusion of “Taiwan is a part of China” in the joint statement during Wang Yi’s visit. The full translation appears after the regional updates.

Philippines Quietly Deepens Defense Ties with Taiwan Amid Rising China Tensions

The Philippines is quietly expanding unofficial defense and security engagements with Taiwan, according to a senior government official in Manila — a development likely to provoke strong backlash from Beijing.

While Manila continues to officially adhere to the “One-China” policy, the source revealed that President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration has ramped up discreet exchanges with Taipei, involving not just coast guard officials but also senior Taiwanese military leadership. These interactions have reportedly included “out-of-uniform” meetings framed as tourism visits, allowing discussions to proceed below the political radar.

Defense Strategy and Geographic Realities

Manila’s quiet outreach to Taiwan reflects a growing recognition that the Philippines’ geographic proximity and security obligations make its neutrality unlikely in a potential U.S.-China conflict over the island. At less than 160 km from Taiwan, the Philippines’ northernmost islands — particularly Batanes and Babuyan — are strategically vital and are now central to Manila’s archipelagic defense strategy.

The Marcos administration is investing in airstrip and seaport upgrades in these regions while preparing for possible noncombatant evacuation operations to extract more than 200,000 Filipino workers from Taiwan in case of a crisis.

Trilateral and Multilateral Engagements

The latest Balikatan joint exercises (April 21–May 9) — the largest U.S.-Philippine drills to date — quietly included Taiwanese observers for the first time, alongside Japanese forces participating as official contributors. While there is no public confirmation of formal Taiwan–Philippine military training, reports indicate Taipei’s involvement in tabletop planning sessions.

Additionally, the U.S. has secured access to four new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites under Marcos, bringing the total to nine, including three in northern Luzon near Taiwan and one on Palawan facing the South China Sea. These bases are designed for rotational U.S. deployments but could also support multinational forces — including Japan and Australia — in future contingencies.

China’s Sharp Warnings

Beijing has reacted strongly to Manila’s shifting position. After Marcos recently stated that the Philippines would inevitably be dragged “kicking and screaming” into any cross-strait conflict, China’s Foreign Ministry warned Manila against “playing with fire” and accused it of interfering in China’s internal affairs.

Despite these warnings, Marcos has deepened defense cooperation with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and other partners, signaling Manila’s alignment with a broader Indo-Pacific security network aimed at countering China’s assertiveness in both the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Implications

Manila’s evolving approach underscores a regional strategic recalibration:

De facto defense integration with Taiwan is accelerating, even without formal diplomatic ties.
The Philippines’ mutual defense treaty with the U.S. and the Taiwan Relations Act make its involvement in any Taiwan contingency increasingly likely.
The expanding EDCA footprint signals Washington’s intent to pre-position forces and logistics close to the first island chain.

As tensions escalate, Manila is walking a fine line — balancing economic interdependence with China against hardening defense alignments that could redefine the region’s security architecture.

A Chinese expert’s views on India-Taiwan relations

During Wang Yi’s recent visit to India, New Delhi’s relations with Taipei came into sharp focus. Chinese experts have largely avoided commenting on India-Taiwan relations as both sides as most of the broadstrokes of the ties are limited to economic sphere. But Chen Zhuo, a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, and member of the South Asia Research Group, wrote an explainer to explain why India supports Taiwan.

I have translated most of the two-page article below:

India’s inconsistent statements not only undermine the positive atmosphere of the latest round of China-India diplomatic engagements but also reveal New Delhi’s real operational logic on the Taiwan issue: creating deliberate ambiguity in rhetoric while quietly expanding practical cooperation with Taiwan wherever possible.

I. Taiwan Cooperation Driven by Strategic Interests

At the level of official discourse, India’s stance on the One-China principle remains ambiguous and inconsistent. Through deliberately vague language, New Delhi avoids making explicit commitments while simultaneously pushing forward economic, trade, and security cooperation with Taiwan — creating a widening gap between rhetoric and practice.

From a trade perspective, India–Taiwan bilateral trade surpassed US $10 billion for the first time in fiscal year 2023–2024, marking a significant increase over the previous year. The trade structure is dominated by electronic components, electromechanical equipment, and ICT-related products. Meanwhile, Taiwanese direct investment in India continued to grow in 2024, with around 200 Taiwanese companies investing US $4.5 billion, creating roughly 170,000 local jobs. Taiwanese enterprises are increasingly prominent in India’s industrial landscape.

India recognizes that successfully embedding its “Make in India” strategy into global supply chains requires leveraging Taiwanese firms’ technological advantages and manufacturing experience in the electronics sector. For example, in February 2024, the Indian government approved a Tata Electronics–PSMC (Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp., Taiwan) joint venture to build a 12-inch semiconductor fab in Dholera, Gujarat — viewed as a major milestone for India’s manufacturing ambitions. Meanwhile, Taiwanese firms like Foxconn and Pegatron are expanding production in South India, contributing to India’s iPhone exports reaching US $12 billion this fiscal year, accounting for nearly three-quarters of total smartphone exports. Despite India’s leadership frequently invoking “strategic autonomy,” these realities underscore a growing structural dependence on external technology and capital.

On labor cooperation, a new area of engagement, India and Taiwan signed a labor mobility MoU in 2024, enabling the first batch of about 5,000 Indian workers to take up manufacturing jobs in Taiwan. While the deal helps Taiwan address chronic labor shortages in its manufacturing sector, India benefits from remittances and deeper economic interdependence. Despite triggering domestic protests in India, the government proceeded with implementation, signaling that Taiwan has shifted from being a peripheral issue to a strategic bargaining chip in India’s policy toolkit. What appears to be simple “labor export” in fact reflects India’s structural limitations in both industrial upgrading and domestic job absorption capacity.

At the same time, security and strategic interactions between India and Taiwan have quietly deepened. Since 2023, exchanges among defense policy experts — including retired senior Indian military officers — have become more frequent. In 2024, the United Service Institution of India (USI) co-hosted a Taiwan Strait wargaming exercise and dialogue with Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) in New Delhi, focusing on conflict-spillover scenarios and supply-chain security risks. While stopping short of crossing formal diplomatic red lines, these interactions indicate a quasi-official security partnership emerging beneath the surface.

Some influential Indian strategists and diplomats have even gone public with their views. Dhruva Jaishankar — son of Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar — argued that, “Taiwan’s absorption would dramatically increase the likelihood of an Asian unipolar order, which India cannot accept. Therefore, Taiwan’s future is of critical importance to India.” This reflects a broader transformation within India’s strategic community: Taiwan is no longer seen as a “distant issue,” but rather a factor with direct implications for India’s security and economic environment.

In sum, India’s simultaneous expansion of economic, labor, and security cooperation with Taiwan has pushed bilateral interaction well beyond the realm of mere “cultural exchanges.” The divergence between India’s cautious official statements and its proactive on-ground actions underscores its dual-track strategy: rhetorical restraint paired with incremental, pragmatic boundary-pushing.

II. India’s Two-Track Discourse

India’s “say one thing, do another” approach on Taiwan is not an improvised tactic but a deliberate, evidence-based policy trend over recent years.

In external communications, India rarely proactively reaffirms the One-China principle and typically responds with vague phrases such as “our position is consistent” or “well-known” when pressed. For example, after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in August 2022, India publicly stated there was “no need to reiterate our long-standing policy,” deliberately avoiding explicit endorsement.

This ambiguity also extends to the international arena. When global media spotlight India–Taiwan cooperation, Indian officials frequently employ diplomatic hedging language — neither denying growing engagement with Taiwan nor directly challenging China’s position. This strategy allows India to maneuver in a gray zone, maintaining strategic flexibility while avoiding direct confrontation with Beijing.

Domestically, India amplifies its narrative management. Many mainstream Indian outlets adopt “Spring and Autumn Annals-style” framing when reporting on Taiwan: portraying India’s occasional adherence to the One-China principle as “reluctant concessions under Chinese pressure” while glorifying its deepening Taiwan ties as proof of India’s independent foreign policy. This shapes public opinion to support greater engagement with Taiwan and provides domestic political cover for India’s ambiguous diplomacy.

This dual approach is carefully calibrated to balance economic gains, diplomatic leverage, and political risks:

Economic Returns Are Tangible
Expanding iPhone exports, Taiwanese investments, and labor agreements all translate into tax revenue, job creation, and industrial upgrading under the “Make in India” framework. State governments compete fiercely to attract Taiwanese investors, offering land concessions, tax breaks, and regulatory fast-tracking — intentionally downplaying potential political sensitivities while foregrounding economic benefits.
Diplomatic Leverage Against China and Beyond
In the context of global supply-chain realignment, Taiwan’s strategic value to India has risen sharply. By engaging Taiwan, India strengthens its hand with the U.S. and Japan while creating bargaining chips in its ongoing competition with China.
Managing Political Risks Through Narrative Control
As long as India avoids crossing Beijing’s “red lines” — namely formal diplomatic recognition and military alignment with Taiwan — cooperation can be framed pragmatically as economic or sub-national partnerships, thereby minimizing backlash and containing political risk.

India’s Taiwan strategy is not confined to operating in a diplomatic “grey zone” but is increasingly intertwined with the China–India border dispute. From New Delhi’s perspective, while China applies direct pressure along the contested border, the Taiwan issue offers an “indirect counter-leverage” tool. As tensions between China and India have intensified in recent years, India has gradually come to view Taiwan as a “balancing card” to offset Beijing’s pressure and gain strategic initiative.

This approach can be traced back to 2010, when the controversy over China issuing “stapled visas” to residents of India’s Arunachal Pradesh sparked strong dissatisfaction in New Delhi. In response, India omitted reaffirming the One-China principle in the joint statement after that year’s bilateral summit — the first such omission — marking the start of India’s strategic softening of language on Taiwan in formal documents. Over time, this framing evolved into a broader policy logic: treating the Taiwan issue as an “indirect lever” to respond to Chinese pressure along the border and to enhance India’s strategic flexibility.

The logic hardened further after the Galwan Valley clashes in June 2020. The deadly confrontation underscored the high costs of direct confrontation with China — from military casualties to foreign capital flight, both of which threatened India’s industrialization and economic modernization goals. Since then, maintaining relative border stability has become India’s primary objective.

At the same time, however, Taiwan has been recast as a maneuverable “secondary front.” India seeks to:

Leverage Taiwanese firms to compensate for industrial and technological gaps
Use political and quasi-military interactions with Taiwan as a tool to constrain Beijing

This framing is evident in a June 2025 report by India’s think tank Observer Research Foundation (ORF), running over 80 pages and titled “India-Taiwan Relations: Strategic Convergences.” The report explicitly argues that once China “resolves the Taiwan question,” Beijing’s attention will inevitably shift back to the China–India border, meaning that the Taiwan Strait crisis and the border security situation are intrinsically linked rather than isolated.

Galwan Valley Clashes

However, India’s “border-Taiwan linkage” approach rests on a fundamental miscalculation. India assumes it can maintain de-escalation along the border while simultaneously escalating engagement with Taiwan, as though the “two fronts” are separate and non-interfering.

For Beijing, however, both the border dispute and the Taiwan question are matters of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security — core interests that are non-negotiable. India’s incremental testing of China’s strategic bottom line on Taiwan inevitably spills over into the border negotiations, eroding Beijing’s trust and narrowing the space for compromise.

If India continues its “salami-slicing” tactics on Taiwan, the predictable outcome is a decline in China’s confidence toward India in border talks, potentially leading to harder positions and a prolonged stalemate.

Here is the link to the article: Guancha.cn

Here is also a Taiwanese perspective on China’s statement during Wang Yi’s visit:

India Responds to Beijing’s Pressure on Taiwan

Upcoming Regional Events

MONDAY — Diplomacy and Defense in Focus

Lee-Trump Summit — South Korean President Lee Jae Myung visits Washington for his first bilateral summit with President Donald Trump. Talks will center on a July deal lowering U.S.-Korea “reciprocal” tariffs to 15%, but Seoul fears tougher U.S. demands could emerge on trade and security.
Super Garuda Shield Kicks Off — Indonesia launches the Super Garuda Shield military drills with the U.S. and 15 partner nations, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The two-week exercise features a live-fire event in Sumatera, underscoring Jakarta’s growing role in regional security cooperation.
China Evergrande Delisting — Troubled developer China Evergrande is officially removed from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, marking a critical chapter in China’s property-sector crisis.
Data Watch — Singapore releases its latest inflation figures.

TUESDAY — Corporate Signals

Earnings — Ping An Insurance Group reports Q2 results, offering insight into China’s broader financial sector health.
Singapore Manufacturing Data — Key indicators to gauge the city-state’s export resilience amid regional slowdowns.

WEDNESDAY — Tariffs, Tech, and Trade

U.S. Tariffs on India Take Effect — Washington’s extra 25% tariff on Indian imports begins, pushing total duties to 50%, among the world’s highest. Imposed as punishment for Russian oil purchases, the move risks straining U.S.-India ties and could trigger supply-chain realignments.
Nvidia Q2 Earnings — AI giant Nvidia reports results amid U.S.-China tech tensions. Investors are watching guidance on China sales after U.S. approval of H20 chip exports faced Beijing security pushback.

FRIDAY — Modi in Tokyo, BYD in Focus

Modi-Ishiba Summit — Indian PM Narendra Modi visits Japan to deepen strategic cooperation with PM Shigeru Ishiba amid Trump’s tariff shocks and supply-chain pressures.
Thai Political Showdown — Thailand’s Constitutional Court rules on PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s fate after a leaked call with Cambodia’s former PM raised questions over military ties and sovereignty risks.
BYD Earnings — Chinese EV leader BYD reports Q2 results, as price wars and competition with Tesla dominate investor sentiment.
Earnings Heavyweight Day — Key results from Alibaba, ICBC, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and COSCO Shipping.
Data Watch — India’s GDP figures and Philippines’ trade balance released.

SATURDAY — Inflation Checkpoint

Sri Lanka Inflation Data — Key numbers on the country’s fragile post-crisis economic recovery.

SUNDAY — SCO Summit in Tianjin

Leaders from China, India, Russia, Pakistan, and Central Asia gather for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. With Modi and Putin attending, talks are expected to focus on India-China ties, regional security, and a potential U.S.-led Ukraine peace framework.

Thank your for reading!