Asia Communique

India's MEA ends Chinese language training in Taiwan | Rumors about Xi Jinping

Hello all,

Some of you who follow me on X may have seen my recent exclusive about India’s Ministry of External Affairs ending its Mandarin language training program for its diplomats in Taiwan.

Multiple sources I spoke to have confirmed that the program has come to an end, and the existing group of diplomats currently in Taiwan will complete their training here. However, all future Mandarin training for diplomats will now take place in Beijing.

History of the Mandarin Language Training Program in Taiwan

Sources have confirmed to me that the Chinese language training program in Taiwan began sometime between 2019 and 2020, with the first recorded group of diplomats sent to learn Mandarin. Prior to this, the language training was conducted in Beijing and Hong Kong.

Some have argued that the decision to shift training was due to the tensions that escalated in Ladakh in 2020. However, this is not the case. The tensions between Beijing and New Delhi were already rising before the June 2020 clashes in Eastern Ladakh.

Sources have also mentioned that there was frustration with the type of Chinese Communist Party propaganda that was part of the language training in Beijing. Therefore, the decision to shift training was part of the need to address the objectivity of language training for young diplomats.

The rationale behind this decision remains puzzling, as other sources I spoke to have stated that the Mandarin training in Taiwan is of equal quality. The restrictions on discussing certain sensitive topics in Mandarin on the mainland would limit the knowledge base of future Indian diplomats. Other diplomats from other countries who have learned Mandarin in Taiwan have told me that discussing sensitive political issues while learning Chinese is a significant barrier on the mainland, but not in Taiwan.

After I broke the exclusive, a number of people reached out asking the same question: Is this New Delhi’s way of signaling a thaw with China? It’s a fair question. But based on what I’ve gathered, this move looks less like a diplomatic olive branch and more like a routine bureaucratic decision—one driven by internal considerations rather than a deliberate push to reset ties with Beijing.

Potential Rationale

From my conversation with multiple people I have heard various explanations. One being the need for diplomats to learn about the political culture in the Chinese mainland by learning Mandarin in the country. There have been issues with transferring the knowledge about China’s political culture learned during language training in Taiwan, a source told me.

Another issue that came up during conversation was the need to learn traditional Chinese characters in Taiwan while the diplomats will spend most of their lives trying to read simplified characters to make sense

These were some of the general concerns that came up during my conversations. There also exist concerns about the future diplomats being influenced by China’s propaganda during language training.

Now, the phase of diplomatic training in Taiwan will now become part of history and would mark a phase of high-level of interaction between New Delhi and Taipei.

No, Xi Jinping Isn’t Going Anywhere

Why delegation doesn’t mean decline — and what the new Party regulations really tell us about power in Beijing

There’s been some chatter lately—half wishful thinking, half bad analysis—that Xi Jinping might be on his way out. The theory goes like this: Xi is increasingly delegating day-to-day responsibilities to loyal lieutenants like Cai Qi and Li Qiang. He’s stepping back. Power is dispersing. Maybe we’re seeing the beginning of a transition?

Let’s be clear: this is a fundamental misreading of both Xi and the system he dominates.

Yes, Xi is delegating more. But delegation isn’t abdication. In a Leninist party-state like China’s, the centralization of power and its selective delegation are two sides of the same coin. The more Xi consolidates control, the more he can afford to delegate—to people he’s personally elevated, molded, and trusts completely. This is not a loosening of grip. It’s a tighter one, with better administrative leverage.

Now, let’s talk about those new Party regulations from June 30—the ones that some commentators are interpreting as signs that Xi’s power is being checked.

Behind Closed Doors, Xi Jinping Tweaks the Party Machine

On June 30, Xi Jinping convened the Politburo—not for a flashy announcement or a sweeping speech, but for something much quieter, and arguably more revealing: a review of new internal regulations that could reshape how key Party organs function.

The meeting focused on a document with a mouthful of a title: Regulations on the Work of the Party Central Committee’s Decision-Making, Deliberative, and Coordinating Institutions (党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例). Dry as that may sound, these bodies are where much of the CCP’s real decision-making happens—think task forces, policy commissions, and leading groups that operate just below the surface of official state functions.

According to the official readout, the Politburo didn’t draft or launch these regulations—they “reviewed” them (审议). That word choice matters. It suggests that the document already exists in some internal form, possibly being amended, or it’s still being finalized for release at a later date. Either way, it fits a pattern we’ve seen before: the CCP moves first behind the scenes, and then—only when convenient—lets the public in on the new rules of the game.

So, while this wasn’t a headline-grabbing event, it’s the kind of institutional housekeeping that tells us a lot about how Xi is fine-tuning his machinery of control.

There are two competing reads here:

• Version A: These regulations formalize Xi’s dominance. They codify how Party leading groups work, effectively giving figures like Cai Qi more structured power—but only within the space carved out for them by Xi himself. It's centralization with process.

• Version B: The new rules include some soft curbs—avoiding personalist language like “the core” in internal minutes, emphasizing that no one should overstep their roles. This, some say, could be an attempt to re-inject institutional norms after years of strongman rule.

But here's the trick: both interpretations can be true—without undermining Xi’s position.

The CCP isn't trying to sideline him. It’s trying to make sure the system under him runs smoother. Xi remains at the top of the pyramid. Delegating to aides like Cai Qi is a way to streamline governance while keeping the levers of power firmly in his own hands. The new rules aren’t a revolt—they’re a managerial update.

And that’s the key misunderstanding behind the “Xi is stepping down” crowd: they confuse signs of administrative rationalization with political retreat. But Xi didn’t spend a decade purging rivals, rewriting the constitution, and making himself the “core” of everything just to bow out quietly.

So yes, you’ll see more of Cai Qi in internal meetings. You’ll hear Li Qiang’s voice a bit louder in economic affairs. But don't mistake that for a changing of the guard.

This is still Xi’s system.
He’s just fine-tuning it.

Xi continues to appear in Chinese state media as usual. On July 8th, Xi was seen in Shanxi on an inspection tour where he was seen in public as normal. Watch the clip here.

My comments and interviews in media:

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Thank you for reading this quick update!