Asia Communique
U.S. Pushes Allies on Taiwan – China’s PLA Conducts Exercises Near LAC (Exclusive) – Chinese Analyst Calls India a “Tumor”
U.S. Pushes Japan and Australia for Clarity on Taiwan War Plans—But Allies Push Back
A quiet storm is brewing in the Indo-Pacific—and it’s not in the Taiwan Strait, but behind closed doors. The Pentagon is pressing its closest allies, Japan and Australia, to spell out exactly what they’d do if war broke out between the U.S. and China over Taiwan.
At the center of this push is Elbridge Colby, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. According to multiple insiders, he’s been urging Tokyo and Canberra to commit more concretely to defense planning and spending—particularly in the event of a Taiwan contingency. But instead of getting clear commitments, he’s stirred frustration.
“Concrete operational planning and exercises that have direct application to a Taiwan contingency are moving forward with Japan and Australia,” one person told FT.
“But this request caught Tokyo and Canberra by surprise because the US itself does not give a blank cheque guarantee to Taiwan.” FT reported citing a source.
Why the fuss?
Colby’s requests have surprised Japanese and Australian officials, especially since the U.S. itself still maintains “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan—essentially refusing to say whether it would come to the island’s defense. As one observer put it: “It’s unrealistic to demand clear answers from allies when America won’t offer one itself.”
Japanese and Australian defense reps have been cautious. Japan says any response would depend on specifics and legal constraints. Australia's defense industry minister flatly rejected hypotheticals, saying any decision would rest with the “government of the day.”
Adding more friction, Colby’s recent actions—like reviewing the AUKUS submarine deal and pushing European allies to stay focused on the Euro-Atlantic—have raised eyebrows. A high-profile U.S.-Japan meeting was even canceled after Colby allegedly upped the ante on defense spending demands.
Why now?
The Pentagon insists it’s all part of a broader strategy to strengthen deterrence in the face of China’s growing military power. With Taiwan increasingly seen as a flashpoint, the U.S. wants allies to step up—faster and more openly.
A Pentagon official summed it up: “These are tough conversations, but we think it’ll leave us all in a better place.”
As Tokyo and Canberra face internal political pressures (Japan’s elections are just around the corner), they’re walking a tightrope—trying to balance U.S. expectations with domestic and regional realities.
Now, we know from previous reporting, that I have independently confirmed, that similar demands have been made from India as well. But New Delhi remains ambivalent about its support as it watches the U.S. and its allies for the their own decision making about Taiwan Contingency.
It also appears that U.S. wants allies in the region to lift the initial burden of responding to a Taiwan Contingency. That’s a big ask right now when the commitment to alliances is under scrutiny.
U.S. Navy to Build Repair Facilities for Philippine Boats Near South China Sea
In a move reinforcing its strategic partnership with the Philippines, the U.S. Navy will build two new facilities for the repair and maintenance of Philippine military boats in Palawan province—directly facing the contested South China Sea. The sites will be located in Oyster Bay and Quezon town, according to a statement from the U.S. Embassy released Wednesday.
The initiative highlights the commitment of both treaty allies to a "free, open, and resilient Indo-Pacific." Palawan is home to the Philippine military’s Western Command, which oversees naval and aerial patrols in the disputed maritime region.
The South China Sea remains a key flashpoint in the U.S.-China rivalry, with overlapping claims from China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. While the U.S. holds no territorial claim, it has pledged to defend the Philippines under its Mutual Defense Treaty if Filipino forces are attacked—including in the South China Sea.
This development follows earlier U.S. military construction under a 2014 defense agreement, which permits American troops to rotate through nine Philippine bases and pre-position equipment. China has yet to comment on the latest announcement but has consistently accused Washington of encircling Beijing through alliances and military cooperation in the region.
The U.S. is pressing its allies for clearer commitments on a potential Taiwan contingency, in part because Washington sees itself actively building joint capabilities—such as the new repair facility in the Philippines. From the perspective of the current administration, these efforts should translate into tangible support for Taiwan. But so far, that hasn’t materialized. Among U.S. allies, only the Philippines has sent a strong signal of alignment with Taiwan, while others remain noncommittal.
A recent report by Washington Post said “The Philippines is quietly working with Taiwan to counter China.”
Now, if you read my newsletter regularly, you will remember that I have hinted at this in previous editions.
Philippines Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro recently acknowledged that Chinese force projection near Philippine waters makes Taiwan’s security a direct national concern. While Manila still upholds the One China policy, it’s also responding to Beijing’s provocations with increasing resolve.
Signs of this policy shift are everywhere: visa-free travel for Taiwanese nationals, closed-door meetings between Taiwanese generals and Filipino defense scholars, joint coast guard patrols in the Bashi Channel, and Taiwanese observers at recent U.S.-Philippines military exercises in northern Luzon—just 130 miles from Taiwan.
Even as China warns the Philippines against "playing with fire," officials in Manila admit that attempts to appease Beijing have failed. Instead, there’s a growing recognition that strategic cooperation with Taiwan may be unavoidable. Shared goals now include greater intelligence sharing and potential joint coast guard patrols.
Still, it’s a delicate dance. A recent visit by two Philippine officials to Taiwan drew a stern rebuke from the foreign ministry for complicating ties with Beijing. But analysts say China’s own aggressive tactics—ramming vessels, cyberattacks, and boardings—are what’s ultimately pushing Manila closer to Taipei.
As one Taiwanese lawmaker put it: the Philippines and Taiwan were once “close strangers.” Now, “the strangers have started to smile at each other.”
Meanwhile, the U.S. has taken a more visible role in Taiwan’s latest Han Kuang military exercises. Several former American military officials were present in Taipei, and it wouldn’t be surprising if serving personnel were also involved behind the scenes.
PLA Resumes High-Altitude Drills in Eastern Ladakh
After a lull in official disclosures, Chinese state media has resumed coverage of PLA exercises near the Line of Actual Control (LAC), spotlighting fresh activity by the 8th Combined Arms Division in Eastern Ladakh.
On 13th July, PLA released footage of a Combined Arms Regiment operating at an altitude of 4,700 meters, likely between Rutog and Aksai Chin. The video showed a PCL-171 mounted on a Dongfeng Mengshi vehicle being test-fired, along with handheld artillery drills targeting distant objects. Notably, unit number LJ53146 was visible on one of the vehicles—despite recent PLA efforts to obscure such identifiers.
A second video, released on 14th July, featured at least 12 PCL-181 howitzers in action at 4,200 meters altitude, likely in the same general area. Though the exact coordinates weren’t disclosed, the consistent terrain and equipment suggest coordinated high-altitude exercises by the 8th Combined Arms Division.
These back-to-back drills underscore the PLA’s continued focus on combined arms readiness in Southern Xinjiang Military District. More importantly, they break a months-long relative silence in PLA-linked media about activity near the contested border—raising fresh questions about China’s intentions amid a fragile military standoff with India.
China-India: Are they two at odds?
China-India ties are showing signs of renewed diplomatic engagement, following External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent visit to China—his first since the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes. During his meetings with Chinese leaders, including President Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Jaishankar emphasized the need for de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control and a more balanced economic relationship. In a notable gesture, both sides agreed to resume direct flights and reopen the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra route after a five-year suspension.
The visit marked a shift in tone, but also revealed lingering sensitivities. Beijing publicly objected to Indian remarks on the Dalai Lama’s succession, calling the issue a "thorn" in bilateral ties. Meanwhile, Jaishankar maintained that stability in border areas remains key to restoring broader trust.
Looking ahead, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to travel to China in late August or early September for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. This would be his first visit since 2019, and could include a bilateral meeting with President Xi. The visit is widely viewed as an opportunity to reinforce the diplomatic momentum generated by Jaishankar’s trip, though India remains cautious about fully normalizing ties without concrete progress on the border front.
Behind the scenes, India continues to watch how China engages with its other neighbors—and with the United States—before committing to deeper strategic alignment. At the same time, Chinese state media is framing the relationship as a potential "Dragon–Elephant Tango," urging both nations to ignore Western influence and reshape the global order together.
For now, China and India appear to be balancing pragmatism with unresolved tensions. The border situation remains delicate, but diplomatic channels are active again. The coming weeks, especially Modi’s anticipated visit, will be a crucial test of how far both sides are willing to go to stabilize a relationship long defined by both cooperation and rivalry.
But underneath all of this pragmatic engagement is frustration in China about India stalling some of the resolutions at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
I came across an article by Liu Zongyi, first shared by Tuvia Gering on X, which criticizes India’s role in the SCO.
The language used is very stark:
对于许多国际问题观察者来说，印度已经成为上合健康发展的一个内部毒瘤。这种看法与金砖国家新开发银行前副行长、巴西经济学家保罗·巴蒂斯塔教授对于印度在金砖国家组织中的看法具有相似之处，巴蒂斯塔教授认为，莫迪领导下的印度日益成为金砖国家的问题。
For many observers of international issues, India has become an internal tumor to the health of the SCO. This view has parallels with that of Professor Paulo Batista, a Brazilian economist and former Vice-President of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), on India in the BRICS organization, which, according to Professor Batista, has increasingly become a problem for the BRICS countries under Modi's leadership.
Here is a translation of the section of the article:
上合的决策依赖“协商一致”原则。印度加入后，印巴冲突的周期性爆发和中印矛盾导致安全与经济议程屡屡受阻，常使议程陷入僵局，使得上合内部协调机制的低效性日益明显。
其次，近年来印度在上合中的抵制和破坏作用日益突出。
从2017年洞朗对峙之后，印度便将上合和金砖国家机制视为对冲和制衡中国影响力的工具，而非深化合作的平台。
经济上，共建“一带一路”倡议已成为包括上合组织成员在内的欧亚大陆发展中国家的一项公共产品，而印度加入后，上合合作文件中凡是提到“一带一路”“人类命运共同体”等中国倡导的合作主张的地方，印度一律反对，希望其他国家支持印度的互联互通和经贸合作主张。
政治上，印度将上合变成迎合其国内民族主义情绪的舞台。特别是2020年加勒万河谷冲突后，印度禁止中国APP并限制中国对印投资，此类政策延伸至上合框架，导致合作停滞。这种对立在2024年上合政府首脑会议上达到顶点，印度成为唯一未在联合公报中支持“一带一路”的成员国，引发其他9国对印度的集体孤立。
Decision-making in the SCO relies on the principle of “consensus”. Since India's accession, the ineffectiveness of the SCO's internal coordination mechanism has become increasingly evident, as the periodic outbreaks of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and the Sino-Indian conflict have led to repeated obstruction of the security and economic agenda, often leading to deadlocks in the agenda.
Second, India's role in resisting and undermining the SCO has become increasingly prominent in recent years.
Since the 2017 Donglang standoff, India has viewed the SCO and BRICS mechanisms as a tool to hedge against and counterbalance China's influence, rather than a platform for deepening cooperation.
Economically, the “Belt and Road” initiative has become a public good for developing countries on the Eurasian continent, including SCO members, and after India's accession, all references to China's “One Belt, One Road”, “Community of Human Destiny” and so on in SCO cooperation documents have been made. After India joined the SCO, any reference in the SCO cooperation documents to “One Belt, One Road”, “Community of Human Destiny” and other cooperation ideas advocated by China was opposed by India, which hoped that other countries would support India's ideas on connectivity and economic and trade cooperation.
Politically, India has turned the SCO into a stage for pandering to its domestic nationalist sentiments. In particular, after the 2020 conflict in the Garhwal Valley, India banned the Chinese APP and restricted Chinese investment in India, and such policies extended to the SCO framework, leading to stagnant cooperation. This antagonism culminated in the 2024 SCO Heads of Government Meeting, where India became the only member state not to support the Belt and Road Initiative in the joint communiqué, triggering a collective isolation of India by the other nine countries.
Here is the archived version of the article by Liu Zongyi: https://archive.ph/IYaSL
Dr. Liu is a leading expert on India, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at the state-affiliated Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), where he holds the position of Senior Fellow at both the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies.
I think a lot of headlines written about S. Jaishankar’s visit to China were misleading. It’s very easy to hark on the “thaw” bandwagon. There are many frustrations both sides, including at the SCO and on the bilateral level. The two sides haven’t even been able to agree to resume the direct flights. There is mistrust over allowing free flow of capital and people-to-people ties.
Therefore, don’t fall for the headline by major news outlets. Follow the signal not the noise.
On the sidelines of the World Peace Forum hosted by Tsinghua University earlier this month, Global Times reporter Su Yaxuan spoke with former Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon. In the interview, Menon highlighted the need for sustained dialogue and the promotion of peace and development in China–India relations.
Menon to Global Times:
Frankly, this idea of India as a "counterweight" is what I'd call pop geopolitics. All the talk of balancing and countering may sound dramatic, but that's not how the world really works.
The China-US relationship is their own to manage. We are not going to be forced into choosing between them - and we will not choose. When we said we were non-aligned, what did that mean? It meant we would not align with one bloc against another. That principle hasn't changed.
We follow our own interests on each issue. Sometimes that may mean working with one country, sometimes with another. That's precisely why we call it strategic autonomy - because we make decisions based on India's national interest, case by case.
Reads:
Nuclear Powers, Conventional Wars — Foreign Affairs
Predictability is the path to stabilizing China-India relations — Global Times
How Nvidia’s Jensen Huang Persuaded Trump to Sell A.I. Chips to China — NYT
The Philippines is quietly working with Taiwan to counter China — WaPo
The new age of geoeconomics — FT
China’s Belt and Road investment and construction activity hits record — FT