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Geedge Leaks Reveal China’s Expanding Global Censorship Network | Gen Z Protests Shake Nepal; China Stays Cautious | North Korea Tests a New ICBM Engine | Pacific Islands Forum: What's Next?

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Nepal’s 2025 “Gen Z” Protests and China’s Response

Background to the Protests

Source: Reuters

In early September 2025, thousands of young people in Kathmandu and other cities in Nepal took to the streets after the government blocked popular social‑media platforms including Facebook, Instagram and X. Officials said the ban was introduced because the companies had failed to register with Nepal’s telecom authorities, but protesters saw it as a censorship tool and the last straw after years of corruption and limited job opportunities. The protests—dubbed the “Gen Z protests”—were largely spontaneous and leaderless. Many participants were high‑school and university students who expressed deep frustration at nepotism and political impunity.

Demonstrations began at Maitighar in central Kathmandu and soon spread to other cities. Some participants broke through police barricades and entered the restricted parliamentary zone, sparking clashes with security forces. Police responded with tear gas, water cannon, batons and rubber bullets, and eventually live ammunition. At least 19 people were killed and more than 100 injured, making it Nepal’s deadliest civil unrest in decades. Human‑rights organizations condemned the use of lethal force; Amnesty International urged the government to de‑escalate the situation and conduct an impartial investigation. Despite lifting the social‑media ban within days, the government’s response fueled further anger and Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli resigned on 9 September.

Themes and Motivations

The protests were driven by more than the social‑media blackout. Years of entrenched corruption, political instability and nepotism created a deep sense of hopelessness among young people. A survey by the World Bank cited by Newsweek found youth unemployment around 20 %—more than double the national average—pushing many young Nepalis to work abroad. Protesters also resented the display of privilege by politicians’ children on social media and demanded accountability and a corruption‑free government. Gaurav Neupane, one of the protest organizers, told Reuters that the youth wanted a government that “thinks independently … and does not play into the hands of any neighbors,” noting that India and China are widely seen as jostling for influence in Nepal.

China’s Response

Absence of a public position on the protests

Unlike the United States, India and other regional actors that issued travel advisories and public statements, the Chinese government avoided explicit comment on Nepal’s Gen Z protests. Chinese state media provided minimal coverage, largely reprinting official Nepali statements. Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not release condemnations or statements of support and treated the protests as an internal matter for Nepal. This silence contrasts with China’s active public diplomacy on issues that directly involve its strategic interests—such as defending the Belt and Road Initiative or critiquing Western aid programs—but aligns with its longstanding policy of non‑interference when allied governments face domestic unrest.

Continued engagement with Nepali leadership

While the protests unfolded, high‑level interactions between Chinese and Nepali leaders continued. On 30 August 2025, just days before the crackdown, Prime Minister Oli met President Xi Jinping in Tianjin during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Xi praised the “historic chapter of good‑neighborliness and friendship” between China and Nepal and highlighted joint work on infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative. In return, Oli reiterated his government’s commitment to the one‑China policy and pledged to deepen cooperation. These comments underscored Beijing’s interest in maintaining close ties with Kathmandu, even as domestic unrest threatened Oli’s position.

Consular advisories for Chinese nationals

The only identifiable public action linked to the protests was a safety advisory. Following the violence, the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu advised Chinese citizens to avoid traveling to border regions and to comply strictly with local laws when crossing into India, warning that accidental crossings without proper visas could lead to detention. Although issued amid heightened tensions along the India–Pakistan border rather than directly referencing the protests, the advisory illustrates Beijing’s cautious approach to protecting its nationals without engaging in Nepal’s internal politics.

Broader context

China has invested heavily in Nepal’s infrastructure, including road and hydroelectric projects, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, and Beijing sees Nepal as a strategic buffer with India. Nepali protesters’ calls for a government free from external influence therefore implicitly challenge Chinese involvement. But Beijing’s muted reaction during the protests suggests a desire to safeguard its long‑term relationship with whoever holds power in Kathmandu rather than risk appearing to meddle. Analysts also note that openly backing a besieged government could undermine China’s reputation among Nepal’s young, urban populations, while criticizing a friendly government would contradict its non‑interference doctrine.

Conclusion

The Gen Z protests in Nepal in September 2025 represented a generational uprising against corruption, censorship and political impunity. Young protesters mobilized via remaining social‑media apps and VPNs, defying curfews and facing lethal force. The violence left at least 19 dead and over 100 injured, prompting international human‑rights groups to call for investigations. The movement forced Prime Minister Oli to resign but did not produce a coherent leadership or immediate policy change.

China, Nepal’s largest foreign investor and strategic partner, responded cautiously. Beijing avoided public statements about the protests, continued high‑level diplomacy with the Nepali government, and issued only a general travel advisory for its citizens. This limited response reflects China’s emphasis on non‑interference and its desire to preserve long‑term relationships rather than take sides in an internal political crisis. As Nepal navigates the post‑Oli transition, Beijing is likely to engage quietly with whichever leadership emerges while monitoring how anti‑corruption and anti‑nepotism sentiments among Nepali youth might affect future bilateral projects.

North Korea tests a new ICBM engine

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un supervised a test of a new solid‑fuel rocket engine for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). State media said the engine can produce 1,971 kilonewtons of thrust—more powerful than previous engines—and described it as a “significant change” in North Korea’s strategic capabilities. Pyongyang said the test completed a series of nine ground trials and paved the way for a next‑generation Hwasong‑20 ICBM. Chinese President Xi sent Kim a congratulatory letter calling for “intensified strategic communication”, highlighting closer alignment between Beijing and Pyongyang.

Pacific Islands Forum: excluding and reincluding partners

The Pacific Islands Forum is currently underway in Solomon Islands from 8–12 September. Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele of Solomon Islands controversially cancelled the dialogue session with external partners (United States, China, France, Japan and others) to allow “time to complete a review” but most observers believe he bowed to Chinese pressure to exclude Taiwan. China insists Taiwan has “no qualification or right to participate” in the forum. At last year’s summit China removed a reference to Taiwan from the final communique, but the 1992 Honiara Declaration permits bilateral dialogues with Taiwan. Palau, which hosts next year’s summit, has pledged to reinstate the more inclusive format. Taiwan issued a statement affirming its commitment to the forum’s inclusive “Pacific Way.”

Geedge Leaks Reveal China’s Expanding Global Censorship Network

A massive leak of 100,000 documents from Geedge Networks — a little-known Chinese tech firm — exposes Beijing’s growing role in exporting advanced censorship tools worldwide.

The files, reviewed by The Globe and Mail and partners, show Geedge supplying systems to at least 40 global providers and governments, including Myanmar, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Kazakhstan. Its flagship Tiangou Secure Gateway mirrors China’s Great Firewall, enabling website filtering, real-time surveillance, VPN blocking, and even internet blackouts.

Geedge works closely with Chinese authorities in Xinjiang, Jiangsu, and Fujian and is expanding under the Digital Silk Road, linked to the Belt and Road Initiative. Co-founder Fang Binxing, the “father of the Great Firewall,” promotes Chinese “cyber sovereignty” abroad, targeting markets like Pakistan, Malaysia, and India.

Analysts warn this “outsourced authoritarianism” threatens a free and open internet, as Geedge’s anti-circumvention updates roll out simultaneously across client states, tightening global information controls.

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