Asia Communique
Lead story: China’s cyber “shooting range” for its neighbors
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Lead story: China’s cyber “shooting range” for its neighbors
The Record reports that leaked technical documents from a Chinese government-linked project show Beijing rehearsing cyberattacks against the critical infrastructure of neighboring countries on a secret training platform. The system appears to sit within a broader ecosystem of Chinese “cyber ranges” developed with private contractors for the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), designed to let operators practice full-spectrum offensive operations in controlled but realistic environments.
Follow‑on analysis of the same leak identifies the core platform as “Expedition Cloud”, a large-scale cyber range built by Nanjing Saining Network Technologies (also known as Cyberpeace) for MPS. Technical documentation describes a distributed range that mirrors real‑world foreign networks, allowing Chinese operators to rehearse intrusions against replicas of:
power grids and other industrial control systems (ICS/SCADA),
transportation and aviation networks,
road traffic management systems, and
enterprise IT environments in foreign countries.
The architecture supports hundreds of trainees and thousands of concurrent connections, with “worker nodes” exposed to the public internet and a separate internal command layer that records all activity for evaluation. Reporting around the leak says foreign infrastructure in regions around the South China Sea and the Indochina peninsula is specifically modeled in scenarios—that is, the systems of China’s immediate neighborhood. A social‑media summary of the trove characterizes Expedition Cloud as being used to simulate attacks on neighboring countries’ power grids and transport infrastructure, with AI tools assisting in scenario planning and execution.
Why this matters
From one‑off hacks to rehearsed disruption. Earlier contractor leaks (I‑Soon, Knownsec) highlighted mass espionage and long‑term access. Expedition Cloud is purpose‑built to practice disruption of critical infrastructure, not just exfiltration.
Crisis playbooks for the neighborhood. By modeling grids, ports, and transport systems in Southeast Asia and along its periphery, Beijing is building a playbook for using cyber disruption as a coercive tool in regional crises short of open conflict.
Civil–military fusion in cyberspace. The range reflects a mature ecosystem in which PLA units, internal security agencies, and private firms train together, enlarging the pool of operators who can be mobilized for state-directed campaigns.
For governments in the region, the likely response will be less public confrontation and more quiet hardening: stronger segmentation of ICS networks, tighter controls on remote access to utilities and transport, and more demanding security baselines for vendors of “smart” infrastructure.
Hong Kong: National security doctrine—and Jimmy Lai’s 20‑year sentence
Beijing has paired an assertive narrative on Hong Kong’s role in China’s national security architecture with the harshest punishment yet for a figurehead of the city’s pro‑democracy movement.
On 9–10 February, China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper titled “Hong Kong: Safeguarding China’s National Security Under the Framework of One Country, Two Systems.” According to Xinhua and China Daily summaries, the document:
stresses the “fundamental responsibility” of the central government for national security in Hong Kong;
casts safeguarding national security as Hong Kong’s “constitutional responsibility,” to be implemented through local legislation and institutions;
claims the National Security Law (NSL) has taken Hong Kong “from chaos to stability and prosperity”; and
promotes the notion of “high‑standard security for high‑quality development” as the guiding principle for the city’s future.
Almost simultaneously, Hong Kong’s courts delivered a landmark sentence in the city’s biggest media‑related national security case. On 8–9 February, Jimmy Lai, the 78‑year‑old founder of the now‑defunct pro‑democracy tabloid Apple Daily, was sentenced to 20 years in prison under the NSL and colonial‑era sedition laws.
Lai had been convicted in December on two counts of conspiracy to collude with foreign forces and one count of conspiracy to publish seditious material, after a 156‑day trial held without a jury before a panel of government‑designated judges.
Prosecutors argued that Lai used Apple Daily and his foreign contacts—citing meetings with senior US officials—as part of a campaign to lobby for sanctions and other punitive actions against China and Hong Kong.
Rights groups and media organizations, including the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Society of Professional Journalists, condemned the verdict and sentence as a “sham conviction” and a severe blow to press freedom; CPJ and others have called for Lai’s immediate release.
Lai has been in detention since 2020 and is already serving separate sentences linked to protest‑related convictions. With the new 20‑year term, he is unlikely to leave prison unless there is a substantial political shift in Beijing’s approach to Hong Kong.
Why this matters
Doctrine meets enforcement. The white paper and Lai’s sentencing are two sides of the same coin: Beijing sets the doctrinal frame (“patriots governing Hong Kong,” security as precondition for development) and the courts then deliver visible, exemplary punishments under that framework.
Rule‑of‑law optics. Formally, the case proceeded through Hong Kong’s courts; substantively, the process—non‑jury trial, government‑designated judges, expansive readings of “foreign collusion”—reinforces perceptions that the NSL has structurally altered the city’s legal order.
Signal to media and civil society. Lai was not just any publisher; Apple Daily was a flagship pro‑democracy outlet. His conviction and 20‑year sentence underscore that media, NGOs, and business elites that engage international partners on political issues now operate under a sharply narrower definition of permissible activity.
For regional observers, the combination of the white paper and the Lai sentence effectively locks in a national‑security‑first model for Hong Kong, with implications for information flows, corporate risk assessments, and how other contested spaces (from Taiwan to border regions) might be governed.
Bangladesh: a Chinese drone factory on India’s doorstep
While Hong Kong illustrates internal security consolidation, South Asia is seeing a quieter but significant shift in external security alignments. A new analysis of Bangladesh’s politics argues that China is poised to widen its footprint as India–Bangladesh ties fray following Sheikh Hasina’s departure and the banning of her party ahead of elections.
The most concrete defense‑related development highlighted is a Chinese‑backed drone manufacturing facility near the Bangladesh–India border, part of a broader set of military‑industrial and infrastructure deals. Chinese Ambassador Yao Wen has been highly active in Dhaka, engaging across the political spectrum and pushing projects that include:
a defense agreement covering drone production and technology transfer;
continued movement on big‑ticket infrastructure, including power and transport; and
discussions on expanded economic cooperation at a time when relations with India have cooled.
Trade with China—around 18 billion dollars annually, overwhelmingly in China’s favor—has given Beijing substantial economic leverage, and Chinese investment has remained comparatively resilient amid Dhaka’s political turmoil. Analysts quoted in the coverage argue that Bangladesh is likely to lean further towards China for economic and defense cooperation, even as its geography makes it impossible to ignore India.
Why this matters
From ports and power to platforms. A Chinese drone factory adds a high‑tech, explicitly military dimension to a footprint that had been dominated by ports, power plants, and roads. It deepens China’s role in shaping Bangladesh’s force structure and doctrine, including surveillance and strike capabilities in the Bay of Bengal.
Strategic encirclement concerns for India. Together with Chinese‑linked facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, the Bangladesh drone facility will reinforce Indian perceptions of a tightening Chinese security ring around its maritime approaches and vulnerable northeast.
Third‑country risk. For Bangladesh, the balancing act is to extract maximum benefits from China while avoiding being pulled directly into Sino‑Indian confrontation. For external partners—including Japan, the US, and the EU—the space for offering alternative security and infrastructure packages may narrow as Chinese projects become more embedded.
This will likely remain a slow‑burn structural shift rather than a sudden crisis, but it will shape India’s military posture and diplomatic outreach in the Bay of Bengal and eastern Himalayas.