Asia Communique

A Reset in Canada-China Relations? | Two Top Chinese Military Leaders Purged | Scott Bessent and He Lifeng Talk Trade

Hello Readers,

I hope your week went well. I am glad to share my new OSINT deep-dive investigation into the People’s Liberation Army Force expanding its presence near Golmud City in Qinghai Province. I have been working on this for a while now and I am happy to share it with you: https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/china-expands-missile-forces-in-tibetan-plateau/.

Meanwhile, welcome to your end‑of‑week roundup of major geopolitical currents from Asia. As the Fourth Plenum of China’s Communist Party approaches, President Xi Jinping is not just tidying up the agenda — he is cleaning house.

Meanwhile, Washington and Beijing may be inching back to the negotiating table even as they hurl tariffs and export controls at each other. Below, we unpack why the removal of senior Chinese generals is more than a corruption story and why the latest U.S.‑China trade phone call could set the tone for the next Trump–Xi meeting.

PLA Purge: Xi Replaces Powerful Generals Ahead of a Key Party Meeting

China’s defense ministry announced that two of the nation’s most senior military officers — Vice‑Chairman He Weidong and navy admiral Miao Hua — along with seven other generals have been expelled from the Communist Party and the military. The ministry said the men had “seriously violated Party discipline” and were suspected of crimes involving “an extremely large amount of money.” The statement described their offences as “of a grave nature, with extremely detrimental consequences” and hailed the purge as a “significant achievement” in the campaign against military corruption.

He Weidong’s removal is unprecedented because he sat not only on the Central Military Commission (CMC) but also on the Politburo. Reuters notes that his ouster is the first time since the Cultural Revolution that a sitting CMC vice‑chairman has been purged . As one of two vice‑chairs, He was the third‑most powerful commander of the People’s Liberation Army; his promotion to the commission in 2022 skipped the usual step of serving on the 205‑member Central Committee. The purge also includes Miao Hua, the PLA’s former political commissar, and other high‑ranking officers such as He Hongjun, Wang Xiubin, former Eastern Theater commander Lin Xiangyang, and ex‑political commissars of the PLA Army and Navy. Many of these officials had been absent from public view for months.

Why now? Analysts see the timing as part of Xi’s effort to reshape the military before the party’s Fourth Plenum. Wen‑Ti Sung of the Atlantic Council says Xi is “cleaning house” so he can appoint loyalists to the CMC, which has been half‑vacant since spring . The purge therefore serves two purposes: it signals zero tolerance for corruption, and it allows Xi to tighten his grip on the armed forces at a moment when China’s military modernization faces headwinds from stalled economic growth and a slowing defense budget.

There is also a Taiwan connection. He Weidong previously commanded the PLA’s Eastern Theater, which oversees operations around Taiwan, and he oversaw live‑fire drills after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in 2022 . His downfall removes a general thought to have close ties to Xi , underscoring how rapidly fortunes can change in today’s China. Beyond internal politics, the shake‑up could delay decision‑making within the PLA at a time when the United States and its allies are watching the cross‑Strait military balance closely.

Earlier, we heard about widespread corruption within the Rocket Force, which led to a series of purges across its ranks. It’s important to remember that China’s military-industrial complex is expanding at a breakneck pace—and if precedent holds, corruption is likely to be rampant. Another factor to keep in mind: since the fall of former Foreign Minister Qin Gang, rumors of leaks from within the Rocket Force have been persistent. These leaks may have left Xi Jinping increasingly paranoid, as they suggested he could no longer trust those closest to him. Much of this remains the realm of Pekingology—the art of interpreting opaque signals from Beijing’s inner circle. The picture is still unclear as to why He Weidong and Miao Hua were dismissed. One thing, however, seems certain: Xi doesn’t trust anyone, not even his closest allies. The deeper question remains—what is the ultimate source of this mistrust? That’s the line of inquiry worth pursuing.

U.S.–China Trade: A “Frank” Call Masks Deeper Strains

Even as Xi cleans house, Washington and Beijing are trying to keep the trade war from spiraling. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent held a phone call with Chinese Vice‑Premier He Lifeng on Friday. Bessent later told reporters that the discussion was “frank and detailed” and that the two sides will meet in person next week . According to the South China Morning Post, Bessent said he would speak with He at around 8:30 p.m. and that He would join him “probably a week from tomorrow” in Malaysia to prepare for a meeting between Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping . The call was the first since Beijing announced new export curbs on rare‑earth elements on October 9, a move widely seen as retaliation for Washington’s expansion of its trade blacklist.

The U.S. response has been hawkish. President Trump threatened to impose an additional 100 per cent tariff on all Chinese goods starting November 1, but he acknowledged to Fox Business that such a tariff would “not be sustainable” . He justified the threat by pointing to China’s tightened control over rare‑earth exports . In the same interview, Trump confirmed he still plans to meet Xi in South Korea and insisted he wants a “fair” deal . The combination of new export controls and tariff brinkmanship underscores how deeply trade and technology have become entwined in the geopolitical contest.

The stakes are wider than bilateral politics. WTO Director‑General Ngozi Okonjo‑Iweala warned that a prolonged U.S.–China decoupling could slash global economic output by 7% and urged both sides to de‑escalate . Bessent meanwhile criticised China’s state‑driven industrial policies at the IMF’s steering committee, arguing they create excess capacity that floods the world with cheap goods . In response, China’s Commerce Ministry accused Washington of undermining multilateral trade rules and vowed to intensify its use of WTO dispute mechanisms . Beijing also bristled at Bessent’s remark that one of He Lifeng’s aides was “unhinged”; it said the comments “seriously distort the facts” .

Behind the scenes, the two sides are still maneuvering. SCMP reports that both sides recently imposed new port fees on each other’s ships and that the Trump administration has threatened to halt imports of Chinese cooking oil. Bessent told Bloomberg‑aligned media that he believes “things have de‑escalated” and that the Malaysia meeting will lay the groundwork for the Trump–Xi summit . Yet with the November deadline for tariff relief approaching, and U.S. politics entering an election year, the room for compromise may be shrinking.

Commentary

This week’s headlines illustrate the nexus of domestic politics and international strategy. In Beijing, the anti‑corruption purge is less about moral rectitude and more about control. By ousting He Weidong and filling the Central Military Commission with loyalists, Xi is ensuring that any future conflict — whether over Taiwan or within the party — will be fought on his terms. The move also signals to the rank and file that loyalty is more important than competence and that no one, not even a Politburo member, is immune.

Washington and Beijing’s trade dance, meanwhile, has become a game of chicken. Both sides are using tariffs and export controls to gain leverage, but neither wants a collapse of trade that could tip the global economy into recession. Bessent’s willingness to describe his call with He as “frank and detailed” suggests a desire to keep communications open, yet the public posturing — from Trump’s unsustainable tariff threats to Beijing’s new port fees — reveals how far apart the two capitals remain. The forthcoming Trump–Xi meeting will test whether mutual economic pain can overcome political theatrics.