India and China’s Disengagement – A Step Towards Stability or a Tactical Pause?

Asia Communique: Shifting dynamic of power in Asia

Nov 18, 2024

Hello Readers,

I have taken the time to access some details of the patrolling pact between India and China, which was announced last month. Below are some thoughts and an assessment.

Background and Current Developments

Since the deadly 2020 clash in the Galwan Valley, where 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers died, the border dispute between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has been fraught with military standoffs and strained diplomacy. The recent agreement reached in late October 2024 marks a significant milestone as both sides have pulled back troops from critical flashpoints—specifically the Depsang Bulge and Charding Nala (Demchok) in the eastern Ladakh region. This move comes after years of fruitless negotiations and follows earlier disengagements at four other LAC points between 2020 and 2022, including Pangong Tso’s north bank, Gogra Post (PP17A), Gogra-Hotsprings area (PP15), and the Galwan Valley (PP14).

Personally, I view the so-called disengagement as a limited “patrolling pact,” which doesn’t reset the relationship. I have used the word “disengagement” in the newsletter, but a better way to describe it would be “patrolling pact.”

Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar described the deal as “welcome,” signifying potential for further de-escalation. Yet, the core details remain ambiguous, and it is uncertain whether this step marks the beginning of deeper cooperation or a mere tactical pause. The agreement precedes the BRICS summit in Russia, enabling a face-to-face meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping—their first since the 2020 crisis.

Another troubling details is that some reports suggest China has been given access to patrol in Yangtse area in Arunachal Pradesh. India has resisted allowing China to patrol in this strategic locale. Beijing has desired access to Yangtse for a very long time as the area gives India a significant strategic advantage in the Eastern sector. Is this the quid pro quo that helped bring about the patrolling pact? We don’t have all the details as both sides have kept the finer details from the public.

Strategic Motivations Behind the Agreement

Analysts suggest that domestic and international optics played a role in the timing. For Modi and Xi, the deal allows each leader to project strength and control. The disengagement showcases a return to diplomatic norms, enabling both countries to manage public and geopolitical expectations. However, Andrew Scobell and Sameer Lalwani of the USIP underscore that while the agreement may ease immediate tensions, it does not resolve the underlying strategic rivalry.

What’s the Deal?

The disengagement agreement inked in October has been implemented. Troops and temporary infrastructure (think tents and prefabs) have been pulled back, and coordinated patrols have begun at these contentious sites. Here’s the breakdown:

1. Depsang Bulge: Indian patrols can now access long-blocked points (PP 10-13) near the Y-Junction, a huge relief since patrol restrictions were a sore spot since 2020.

2. Demchok (Charding Nala): Both sides removed structures and pulled back forces, paving the way for more controlled activity in this hotspot.

The kicker? Weekly patrols are now coordinated, with local commanders ironing out the ground rules. In short: fewer standoffs, fewer eyeball-to-eyeball moments, and hopefully, no unplanned escalations.

Oh, and just to sprinkle in some goodwill, troops exchanged sweets during Diwali. Sweet gesture or sweet-talking? You decide. 🎁

Implications for India-China Relations

Jaishankar has reiterated that restoring trust will be a gradual process. The past decade’s Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) helped maintain relative peace, but their efficacy was tested during the 2020 Galwan clash. While disengagement at Depsang and Charding Nala is a meaningful step, creating buffer zones alone will not rebuild confidence. Trust will depend on consistent implementation of patrol protocols and phased de-escalation.

Economic considerations also play a role in the thaw. China remains India’s largest trading partner, and both nations stand to benefit from greater economic collaboration. However, strategic analysts, including Lalwani, caution that this step does not herald a comprehensive shift. India is expected to continue protecting its technological sectors from Chinese influence, deepening ties with partners like the U.S. and the Quad, and prioritizing its maritime focus.

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How Do Chinese Experts View the Patrolling Pact

Chinese analysts interpret this disengagement as a product of strategic recalibrations by both nations. Lin Jian, a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, emphasized that China seeks to maintain a “strategic and long-term perspective” while managing differences with India. Through multiple high-level meetings this year, including talks between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, both sides have laid the groundwork for sustained peace and dialogue. These efforts underscore a shared commitment to avoiding disruptions that could undermine broader relations.

Lin Minwang of Fudan University attributes this progress to geopolitical shifts, including India’s evolving relationship with the United States. He observes that India’s increased engagement with China reflects an attempt to hedge against the uncertainties of U.S. foreign policy. “It is clear that China-India relations have come out of the lowest point, but how far they will climb back remains to be seen,” Lin remarks, highlighting that recent diplomacy is not without challenges.

Economic Realities and Policy Adjustments

Despite ongoing efforts to reduce economic dependency, India remains deeply connected to Chinese supply chains. Trade between the two nations continues to grow, with bilateral trade expected to reach $118.4 billion in 2024. Analysts, including Lin, note that India’s technological limitations in sectors like electronics and telecommunications make complete decoupling impractical. Furthermore, Hu Shisheng of the CICIR stresses that India’s previous attempts to “de-Sinicize” its economy have hindered its industrial competitiveness and global attractiveness.

Hu Shisheng, Director of the Institute for South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) on the disengagement:

“In the past four years, India has tried to promote "de-Sinicization" and decouple from China to implement the strategic policy of industrial development, and hoped to gain strategic advantages by taking advantage of the game between China and the United States. It turns out that this is not a feasible approach. Due to past tensions between China and India, India has lost the opportunity to cooperate with China in manufacturing and industrial chains, which is actually not conducive to India showing its economic attractiveness in the global South. In other words, the real consequences of distancing itself from China are already facing India. Now that India has entered a new stage of development, it is timely for India to adjust its relations with China and respond to domestic calls. The progress in the border issue between the two sides this time also shows that the forces friendly to China in India are growing stronger and gradually gaining the upper hand. As the Prime Minister of India, Modi is also the head of a developing country with a population of over 1.4 billion. Therefore, the development problems faced by India actually have many similarities with those faced by China. One of the keys is how to achieve sustainable economic and social development in a country with a large population.”

Impact on U.S.-India Relations

The U.S. has closely monitored India-China dynamics, especially as they relate to its strategic partnership with India. The 2020 conflict pushed New Delhi to strengthen ties with Washington, positioning itself against China’s assertiveness. According to Daniel Markey of USIP, while the new LAC agreement reduces the immediate risk of conflict between nuclear powers, it does not change India’s strategic trajectory. New Delhi’s commitment to cooperating with the U.S. in areas such as defense, technology, and regional security is likely to continue unabated.

Should India and China pursue further rapprochement, any shift will be slow. The U.S. is positioned to adapt its partnership with India as needed, focusing on enhancing India’s capacity to act as a regional counterbalance to China.

The Road Ahead

While the recent disengagement signifies a positive shift, substantial challenges remain. India and China must work towards de-induction and deeper de-escalation to return to pre-crisis force levels. Trust-building will require more than troop withdrawals; it will need sustained dialogue, updated CBMs, and consistent implementation of protocols to prevent future clashes. Modi and Xi’s directive for their Special Representatives to meet after a five-year hiatus is a promising sign, suggesting potential future diplomatic progress.

Conclusion: Stability or Strategic Pause?

The disengagement agreement at Depsang and Charding Nala is an essential first step in managing tensions, but it is far from resolving the broader strategic competition between India and China. Trust will not be easily rebuilt, and strategic rivalry persists.

China hasn’t slowed down the construction of strategic infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control. Unlike the infrastructure that was removed, which werely mostly prefab structures, the other structures in the area are for more permanent and long-term deployment.

Next summer, the two sides will begin full-fledged patrolling across their disengaged points. The period will test whether the two sides can manage the border without engaging in another clash. The February to March period will reveal if the current patrolling pact will hold and lead towards further reduction of tensions.

Post-Communiqué

I highly recommend listening to a conversation Kapil Sibal’s podcast on YouTube with Shiv Shankar Menon, Ashok Kantha and Subramanian Swamy. Sibal speaks to Menon, Kantha and Swamy about tensions with China.

Books

I have started reading Kevin Rudd’s new book titled “On Xi Jinping: How Xi's Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World”

I don’t agree with Rudd’s analysis of China’s new security posture, which seeks to merely ensure regime security. But Rudd’s core argument that Xi is taking a more ideological approach to Chinese politics, focusing on Marxism-Lennism, is well worth reading. The book closely reads Xi’s pronouncements in the ideological journal Quishi and other documents to get into the leader’s mind.

Recommendations

My colleague at TaiwanPlus News has an excellent newsletter on Taiwan’s defense. I would highly recommend subscribing to the newsletter. Subscribe here: